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Publisher's Note
The Permanent Commission on the Status of Racial, Indigenous, and Tribal Populations
(hereinafter referred to as “Permanent Commission”) was established by the Maine State
Legislature in 2019 as a non-partisan, independent entity with a mission to improve the
status and outcomes for historically disadvantaged racial, Indigenous, and tribal populations
in the state. To help achieve this, the Permanent Commission conducts public hearings;
advises and consults with all three branches of state government; and sponsors legislation.
It is comprised of 17 members who represent the broad racial and socio-economic diversity
of the state, including a member of each of the four federally recognized tribal nations.
It is through this lens - along with a commitment to fully realizing the human and civil
rights of all Mainers, and in honoring the inherent rights, privileges, powers, duties, and
immunities of the Wabanaki tribal nations - that the Permanent Commission publishes
this document, One Nation Under Fraud: A Remonstrance, at the request of the authors. A
version of it will be forthcoming in Volume 75.2 of the Maine Law Review in 2023.
The original Remonstrance of the Penobscot Nation contained in these pages was considered
by the Maine House of Representatives during the 23rd Legislature. At that time, a vote was
taken on the question of printing 300 copies for the full consideration of the Legislature,
but the motion failed by one vote, and it was not printed.1
Now, 188 years later, the Permanent Commission will print exactly 300 copies of this
document to distribute to the executive branch, judicial branch, all members of the 130th
Legislature, constitutional officers, and the governmental offices of the Wabanaki Nations.
Electronic copies will also be made available by request of the Permanent Commission at
permanentcommission.ritp@maine.gov.
The opportunity to help educate Mainers on the historical truth of our state’s relationship
with the Wabanaki Confederacy and the generational impact of this history on all Mainers
is one that the Permanent Commission holds in high regard. We are forever grateful to
the Hon. Donna Loring, Hon. Eric Mehnert, and Joseph Gousse, Esq. for their historical
knowledge, brilliant writing skills, and their unwavering courage to challenge the origin
story of statehood and Maine’s sense of exceptionalism. This strengthens our belief in the
sovereignty of the Wabanaki, the People of the Dawn, the first peoples of this territory to
whom this land belongs since time immemorial.
In Solidarity,

Ambassador Maulian Dana, Penobscot Nation
Co-Chair
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Representative Rachel Talbot Ross
Co-Chair

Report of legislative proceedings, Kennebec Journal (Augusta, ME), February 7, 1834.

Report of Legislative Proceedings
Kennebec Journal
February 7, 1834
Mr. Vose called up the report of the committee on the subject of the purchase of
lands of the Penobscot Indians.
Mr. Call of Bangor moved that 300 copies of the report and accompanying statement
of fact in relation to said purchase be printed for the use of the members.
The reasons for printing being called for, Mr. C stated that he considered the subject
as one of great importance, inasmuch as it involved not only the welfare of the
Indians, but good faith o f the State---he was not, and he presumed members of the
House were not qualified to act understandingly on the subject form merely having
the statements read. The question was then taken on printing; the vote being 63 in
the affirmative and 63 in the negative was decided in the negative by the casting vote
of the Speaker.
Mr. Call was disappointed that the House had refused to print the report as such
a measure could only be intended to enable members to act understandingly on
a subject, in which they would otherwise be compelled to act in the dark. He had
never seen the statement of facts before and had not the advantage of judging of
them. […] That the fact of the negotiation was not known at Old Town village until
some time afterwards. It also appears there was a division among the Indians —
some were for selling and some were opposed; but it does not appear what portion
were for and what portion opposed. now whether those in favor were authorized to
act for the tribe. The statement of facts which the committee have been instructed
to report appears to throw very little additional light on the subject [...] it does not
enable us to understand the merits of the matter; It appears from the report of the
committee that the commissioners and Gen. Webber said the sum to be paid was
a fair price for the land, they say that in examining the witnesses one of them was
“apparently satisfied” why report that way? Why did they not examine him and
know whether he was satisfied or not. But it is also stated that the Indian agent said
the lands were worth more than they were sold for, but it is said he consented to the
sale and contented himself with the extraordinary reason that it made no difference
to the Indians whether they got the worth of their land or not; that it was better for
them to sell for half the value then to keep the land. It may be so but Mr. E feared the
effect of taking away the land would be to destroy the Indians. If this was the object
of the Legislature or of the agent then such reasoning might pass current, but he felt
an obligation to protect the Indians, or at least to do them no manifest injustice.
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PART I: PREFACE
“To the living we owe respect, but to the dead we owe only the truth.”
—Voltaire (1694-1778 A.D.)
“All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to
discover them.”
—Galileo Galilei (1564-1642 A.D.)
I. AUTHOR’S NOTE
Maine became a state on March 15th, 1820.
Five months after Maine became a state it would sign a treaty with the
Penobscot Nation on August 17th, 1820, in Bangor. The Treaty was nearly the
same treaty that was signed between the Penobscot Nation and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1818, with the exception that the 1820 Treaty
did not provide for the transfer of two acres on the Brewer waterfront to the
Penobscot Tribe. My ancestors viewed the signing of the Treaty in 1820 as a last
effort to survive as a tribe and keep their sovereignty in the face of overwhelming
odds. Signing meant that they would secure a small bit of land consisting of four
townships, the islands in the Penobscot River, as well as their home island—
known today as Indian Island. The Treaty would preserve future generations.
Maine saw the signing of the Treaty as the creation of a document not of
sovereignty, but of surrender. The ink was not even dry on the Treaty before
Maine asserted guardianship over the tribes and treated the Wabanaki people as
wards of the State. The State considered the tribes as “paupers” and “imbeciles”
and proceeded to institutionalize the control it exercised over the tribes through
the appointment of “Indian Agents”—government officers purposed as the
gatekeepers for all land transactions with the lumber barons, and the treasurers for
all funds dispersed to the tribes for their everyday needs. It was in this manner
that the Agents and State were able to control the tribes and keep them in a state
of perpetual poverty—a population of manufactured “paupers.” Today—two
hundred years after the signing of the Treaty—no tribal community in Maine has
infrastructure comparable to that of the closest towns, nor do all tribal
communities even have access to clean water.
Over the years, it has been my observation that at the highest levels of
both tribal and State government, the tribes have never been able to become
economically self-sustaining. We grew up in poverty, and the only “way out” was
to leave the community to find work or to join the military. The question that has
long lingered in my mind is: “Why is it that Wabanaki tribes in this State have
never gained any sort of economic foothold?” Growing up in this environment of
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pauperism and excoriation took a mental toll on all of us. Tribal leaders made
every effort to move ahead and improve the lives of their people but always ran
up against roadblocks. We all knew there was a reason we could not move
forward in a progressive way—we just couldn’t prove our suspicions. The tribes
fought for their sovereign rights in the court systems and in the Legislature, all to
no avail.
It was in this atmosphere of two hundred years of utter frustration and
despair that I finally found what I have begun to call the “Indian Papers” buried in
special transcripts of the 1942 Legislative Research Committee. There it was.
Finally, the facts were in plain view, and in the words of the Committee members
and State officials. The pieces of this puzzle finally fell into place. It was a picture
of deceit, greed, theft, neglect, isolation, and genocide. It was the answer to my
question.
The takeaway for me in all of this is that the Wabanaki people are proud,
honorable, and brave survivors of attempted genocide. In the spirit of my
ancestors who, in 1833, solemnly affixed their marks to a remonstrance protesting
the “Theft of the Four Townships” and the illegal dispossession of my people, this
Remonstrance will show it to be a miracle that we are still here.
And that there is restitution to be made.
—Donna Loring, November 2021

II. INTRODUCTION
“It does not require many words to speak the truth.”
—Hinmatóowyalahtq̓ it (or, “Chief Joseph”) (1840-1904 A.D.)
Maine’s is a history of fraud.
Modern empowerment of the once-subaltern narratives of colonized
peoples has given rise to common acceptance of an undeniable truth: the history
of America is one of brutality, fraud, and conquest. That the United States of
America has committed innumerable crimes against the Native Americans upon
whose land we live will come as no surprise to anyone with access to a history
book or the internet. But what of the sleepy, seemingly homogenous State of
Maine? The depth of the depravity with which Maine—often heralded as a
“progressive” and sometimes even “milquetoast” state where little happens, and
little offends—has persecuted the Wabanaki people is largely expunged from
public consciousness. It is the aim of the authors to contribute to a counter-
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cultural narrative in which critical analysis of the historico-legal and economic
discourse of Maine’s abuse of the Wabanaki people can be accurately portrayed
and in good faith discussed.
The purpose of this Remonstrance is not to point out the obvious. Nor
have the authors set out to retrace the broadly familiar history of American
genocide of indigenous cultures. To do so would contribute little new intellectual
capital to the prevailing discourse. Although we would be remiss not to
acknowledge that modern cultural narratives and understanding have been
attained at great personal cost to the indigenous people of this continent, the
reality is that the “story” of cultural genocide perpetuated by white European and
early American colonists is, broadly speaking, well-defined.
Excepting the work of tribal scholars and historians, much of the
taxonomy of the power relations between Maine and the Wabanaki tribes has
been anecdotal. Maine’s history of predation upon and mistreatment of the tribes
has remained poorly-defined. Indeed, while some oral and written histories of
Maine’s indigenous people have survived to challenge prevailing Euromerican
narratives, modern discourse still lacks a cohesive history tracing the origins,
development, and maintenance of the politico-economic power structures
weaponized by the State of Maine against the Wabanaki people. Despite the oral
and written traditions of a resilient and advanced culture, the preservation remains
largely anecdotal.
It is the authors’ purpose to move beyond the anecdotal and instead
engage in a critical analysis that traces the ontogeny of control exerted by the
State of Maine over the Wabanaki tribes. Grounding our historical analysis in a
recently rediscovered and remarkable written protest by the Penobscot Tribe in
1833 (“the Remonstrance”) this Comment—which the authors have styled as a
“modern remonstrance”—seeks to amplify Wabanaki voices beyond the
Remonstrance of 1833 and give these ancestors a modern platform for their
unresolved grievances.
By engaging in a historico-legal forensic analysis, this Remonstrance
endeavors to excavate the hidden historical narrative of the calculated politicolegal regime that has for two-hundred years driven the State’s coercive policies.
In so doing, this Remonstrance examines the economic imperatives of the early
American and Maine governments and the outgrowth of policies aimed at
generating wealth from the stolen resources of Wabanaki tribal lands and through
in-depth analysis of “Indian Papers” that led to the commissioning of the Proctor
Report of 1942. These “Indian Papers”—which came to light during the writing
of this article—are undeniable primary evidence memorializing the strategy the
State undertook to effect a regime of isolation, control, and elimination of the
tribes. The authors believe that the “Indian Papers” and other documents analyzed
herein has been heretofore neglected as competent evidence of Maine’s conscious
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orchestration of coercive policies carried out and retroactively “legitimized”
through fraudulent jurisprudence. Through critical analysis, we arrive at the
conclusion that not only did the state of Maine have actual knowledge and intent
to thrust an illegitimate politico-legal regime of suppression upon the tribes, but—
despite acknowledging its past bad acts—it consciously chose to adopt many of
these same tactics more than one-hundred years later. Indeed, readers will
discover that the recommendations of the Proctor Report are hauntingly
reminiscent of the State’s earlier implementation of John G. Deane’s “Coercive
System” of 1830—purposed to isolate, control, and eliminate the tribes living on
coveted Maine timberlands.
Through novel contextualization of Law Court decisions like Murch and
Newell, this Remonstrance evidences the depth of politico-legal capital expended
as Maine developed an illegal system of predatory colonialist economics which it
“legitimized” through the courts, but which has no valid precedential basis.
Serving as a centerpiece of this historico-legal analysis, analysis of Murch and
Newell—the “Twin Pillars” of Maine Indian jurisprudence—reveals how
immediately and for centuries this body of law has fortified themes of nonrecognition of tribal sovereignty and a determination to treat the tribes as wards,
imbeciles, and paupers. Ultimately arriving at the unavoidable realization that
Maine’s political and economic mistreatment of the tribes was done to
intentionally dispossess the Wabanaki of their land and resources, this
Remonstrance will examine the lineage of governmental policies and legal
precedent which, layered atop this historical context, offer a stunning reframing of
contemporary assumptions of Tribal-State relations. Ultimately, this examination
arrives at its overarching conclusions:
1.)
That the State of Maine, acting as a
renegade state sovereign in contravention of
Congress and for the purpose of financing its
fledgling statehood, illegally usurped control of
intercourse with the Wabanaki tribes and instituted
a system of predatory economics masquerading as
law; and
2.)
Once tribal resources were depleted, the
State of Maine sought to exterminate the Wabanaki
in dereliction of its duties pursuant to the Articles of
Separation of 1820 because it was economically
advantageous to do so.
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Set against Maine’s forgotten history as a world economic power during
the height of the lumber boom of the mid-nineteenth century, this Remonstrance
examines the
economic imperatives
Maine developed an illegal system of predatory
that fueled Maine’s
colonialist economics which it “legitimized” through
campaigns to divest
the courts, but which has no valid precedential basis.
the tribes of their
land, their ancestral
claim to the oldgrowth forests upon which North American expansion was built, and, ultimately,
tribal sovereignty.
This Remonstrance concludes with a discussion of the ongoing
ramifications of Maine’s predatory politico-legal regime which continues to limit
tribal sovereignty and socio-economic autonomy to this day. Offering
ameliorative and restorative alternatives to the current system, this Remonstrance
suggests ways in which the State of Maine, through executive and legislative
action, can make reparations for the cultural and economic losses suffered by the
tribes under its despotic control.
Ultimately, it is the authors’ intent that the reader come away with a new
perspective on Tribal-State relations as framed by the historical discourse and
politico-legal analysis presented herein. The authors hope their audience will
analyze previously held assumptions and beliefs about Maine’s history and its
discourse with the tribes—and challenge established narratives that have been
assigned to all parties involved.
Nearly two centuries ago, it was said of Maine (once heralded as a
political bellwether) “as she goes, so goes the nation.” Indeed, through the history
revealed in this Remonstrance, the reader will recognize that many of the same
policies, tactics, and conflicts that
plagued American Indian relations
Nearly two centuries ago, it was
during the expansion of the United
said of Maine, “as she goes, so
States were, in fact, first tested in
goes the nation.”
Maine. It is no coincidence, then, that
Andrew Jackson, in his First Annual
Message to Congress in 1829 —in
which he professed that there could be no tribal sovereigns within a sovereign
American nation—expressly referenced Maine’s efforts to exercise control over
the Penobscot:
There is no constitutional, conventional, or legal
provision which allows them less power over the
Indians within their borders than is possessed by
Maine or New York. Would the people of Maine
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permit the Penobscot [T]ribe to erect an independent
government within their state? And unless they did
would it not be the duty of the general government to
support them in resisting such a measure?1
In Maine, where the seeds of systematic control were first sown, their
poisonous legacy flourished for decades. More than one-hundred years later,
during the height of the Maine Indian Land Claims in 1980, Governor James
Longley would invoke the ghost of Jackson when he fired a shot across the tribes’
bow, declaring in fiery
rhetoric that there could be
Governor James Longley would invoke the
“no nation within a
ghost of Jackson when he fired a shot across
nation” in Maine.
the tribes’ bow, declaring in fiery rhetoric that
Now, some two
there could be “no nation within a nation” in
hundred years after Maine
Maine.
entered the Union as a
Free State, it maintains a
stranglehold on tribal
sovereignty. While the Jacksons and Longleys of the world may have won their
goal of an “ultimate sovereign,” they were only able to achieve their “one nation”
by inhumane and brutal policies aimed at effecting the mass removal of
indigenous peoples and theft of native lands.

President Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1829). In his
congressional address, Jackson made an appeal to legislators in favor of what would later become
the Indian Removal Act of 1830, under which the Cherokee and other southeastern tribes were
forcibly removed from their lands and sent west of the Mississippi.
1
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PART II: AN HISTORICAL CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF TRIBALEUROMERICAN RELATIONS
III.

A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT: STATEHOOD, FEEDING THE LUMBER
BOOM, AND THE THEFT OF THE FOUR TOWNSHIPS (1820-1842)

“So we will tell our own story with our voice. So you can hear us. So we can shine
a light on those dark deeds that were done to us.”
— Donna M. Loring2
A. The Theft of the Four Townships: Fraudulent Dispossession of the
Penobscot People
It’s a familiar yet disturbing history. By 1833, the once boundless, verdant
acres of pine forests and riverine valleys in which the Wabanaki people made
their home had been relentlessly hewn, transacted, and concentrated down into a
handful of diminutive land holdings amongst the several tribes. The “Four
Townships” belonging to the Penobscot Tribe by 1833 were reserved to them in
accordance with an 1818 Treaty with Massachusetts.3 The “first two lower”
townships—located around the area of Mattawamkeag Point—were home to a
cultural center seated in a village at the confluence of the Penobscot and
Mattawamkeag Rivers.4 The remaining two northern townships, located near
present-day Millinocket, afforded the Penobscot easy lake access to their ancestral
hunting grounds located in the interior of the River Valley.5 Considering the
Donna M. Loring, It Is Up to Us, in ENOUGH! POEMS OF RESISTANCE AND PROTEST 88 (Claire
Milliken & Agnes Bushell eds., Littoral Books 2021).
3
For a visual representation of the land holdings incident to the 1818 Treaty, see Micah Pawling’s
and Donald Soctomah’s “1818 Penobscot Treaty with Massachusetts: A Map of the Four
Townships” under Appendix A. Although perhaps assumed by many, it bears specific mention
that all of the “negotiations” and treaty writings thereto were conducted and recorded in the
English language, with interpreters “serving” to communicate information to tribal delegates. The
issue of language is, of course, of critical importance when considering whether language barriers
may have led to disparate understandings between parties. In fact, federal Indian law has evolved
to take historical language barriers into account when construing the intent of parties and the
impact of intercultural treaties between Euromericans and indigenous peoples. As part of federal
Indian jurisprudence, a core tenet holds that—stemming from these historical inequities—any
ambiguities of the written English terms are construed in favor of the tribe. This, of course,
follows a fundamental principle of contract law which holds that any ambiguities in contractual
language are construed against the drafting party.
4
See C.B. O’Hara, Jr., A Brief History of Mattawamkeag up to 1900, http://www.witmaine.com/a-brief-history-of-mattawamkeag-up-to-1900.html.
5
See Micah Pawling, Wabanaki Windows, Unpacking Sovereignty (6th in a series), at 43:34 (July
21, 2021), https://archives.weru.org/wabanaki-windows/2021/07/wabanaki-windows-7-27-21unpacking-sovereignty-6th-in-a-series/.
2

Loring, Mehnert & Gousse

7

immense difficulty that the Wabanaki, by 1833, were experiencing with hunting
and trapping in British North America at the hands of the Hudson Bay Company,
access to these ancestral hunting grounds had by this time become vital to their
survival.6 The Penobscot Tribe had little, if any, interest in selling or otherwise
dispossessing itself of the Four Townships. But that did not deter Maine, which
was hellbent on acquiring quiet title to as many acres of old growth forests as
could be had in an effort to fund a “land lottery” designed to lift the impoverished
fledgling state out of near-bankruptcy.
To fully understand Maine’s history as an economic dependent of the
tribes, it is first necessary to acknowledge that it is a legacy inherited from its
progenitor, Massachusetts. In the wake of the American Revolution, the colonies
struggled mightily in their infancy as independent territories. Massachusetts, for
example, was financially destitute. As one 1829 history reflected upon
Massachusetts’s financial straits following the Revolution:
[H]er people borne down with the weight of taxes—
her treasury empty—her credit that of a bankrupt—
her paper currency worth, in the market, scarcely 10
per cent of its normal value—her commerce next to
nothing—her utmost exertions barely able to
discharge the ordinary expenses of government, in
time of peace.7
Facing a premature demise, Massachusetts weighed its options. Further
taxation—a sore subject amongst the Americans—was “out of the question.”8 In a
stunning mimicry of the very imperial regime it had just fought so mightily to
overthrow, Massachusetts turned to exploitation of the District of Maine’s
“exhaustless merchandise” of
Like the cuckoo bird come to roost and
timber for salvation.9 In the eyes
of Massachusetts’s first governor, deposit its imposter offspring, so too
would Massachusetts leech from the
John Hancock, the millions of
acres of unsettled real estate in the lifeblood of its host to survive.
District were “just waiting to be
turned into desperately needed funds for the new Commonwealth.”10 Like the
cuckoo bird come to roost and deposit its imposter offspring, so too would
Massachusetts leech from the lifeblood of its host to survive.

See id.
THOMAS URQUHART, UP FOR GRABS: TIMBER PIRATES, LUMBER BARONS, AND THE BATTLES
OVER MAINE’S PUBLIC LANDS 6 (2021).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
6
7
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When Maine became a state in 1820, it picked up exactly where
Massachusetts had “left off”—commissioning land surveys and engaging in
countless transactions and grants for the purpose of converting its timber
resources into economic gain. By 1859, Maine retained a paltry 2,000,000 of the
8,000,000 acres of wilderness lands it had once possessed at its zenith.11 These
holdings were further depleted when, in 1868, the State granted nearly 700,000
acres to the European & North American Railroad Company—leaving it with a
mere 213,880 acres of wild lands left in its control.12
Concurrent with the dizzying expansion of Maine’s lumber industry, the
tribes not only had to contend with an increased lumberman presence13 in their
territory, but also suffered lumber pirates, trappers, and hunters as they began
encroaching on reservation lands. When, in 1829, Penobscot Lieutenant Governor
John Neptune appealed to the Legislature to intervene in the encroachment upon
tribal lands, lawmakers brazenly responded by “authorizing” Maine’s Governor to
“negotiate” for the sale of two of the Penobscot Nation’s Four Townships. It was
a stunning and open display of hostility—shocking even by the State’s standards
at the time. Rather than addressing the Penobscots’ concerns, the State greedily
hijacked Neptune’s appeal as an opportunity to secure territories the State had
long coveted given their claimed military significance as artillery access roads
leading to the British frontier.14
On the heels of its gambit, Maine commissioned one of the most infamous
figures in State-Tribal history, John G. Deane, to negotiate the purchase of the
two lower townships in question.15 Deane’s mandate was to acquire those two
townships with access to an eastern road that had been built from present-day
Milford to Greenbush and across the county towards Houlton, Maine—this
belonging to those territories long claimed to have military significance in
securing the international border.16 More specifically, Maine believed that the
Houlton area was of critical importance in Maine’s ongoing efforts to stave off
the advancement of British forces in present-day Canada who, despite the Treaty
of Ghent, continued to dispute the international boundary—which was readily

JAMES ELLIOTT DEFEBAUGH, HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY OF AMERICA, VOL. 2, 29
(1907).
12
Id.
13
As an example, by the mid-1800s, members of the Penobscot Tribe were outnumbered 1,000 to
1 by non-indigenous lumbermen patrolling their ancestral forests. See BUNNY MCBRIDE &
HARALD E.L. PRINS, INDIANS IN EDEN: WABANAKIS AND RUSTICATORS ON MAINE’S MOUNT
DESERT ISLAND, 1840S-1920S 12-13 (2009).
11

See URQUHART, supra note 10, at 45; see also Harald Prins, Wabanaki Windows, Unpacking
Sovereignty (6th in a series), at 10:41 (July 21, 2021), https://archives.weru.org/wabanakiwindows/2021/07/wabanaki-windows-7-27-21-unpacking-sovereignty-6th-in-a-series/.
15
See Prins, supra note 17.
16
See id.
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supplied by the eastern road.17 These tensions would eventually precipitate the
political conflict referred to as the “Aroostook War”—a misleading moniker
given the fact that no active military confrontation took place.18 It was a “War of
Words” in the truest sense, and the perceived military importance of the two
lower townships was never legitimized.
Having been authorized by the Legislature to pay any amount necessary to
secure the purchase of the two townships,19 Deane departed to treat with
Penobscot Governor John Attean at Indian Island.20 Upon arrival, Deane was
frustrated to discover that Governor Attean would not negotiate or assent to terms
until the Tribe had formed a general assembly.21 That Deane was surprised and/or
dismayed by this was, of course, the product of his own ignorance. It had been
common knowledge since the Wabanaki’s first dealings with the Europeans that
tribal leaders were not traditionally imbued with absolute decision-making
authority on behalf of their people.22 Rather, “[t]hey exerted authority only so far
as their followers were willing to comply with their advice . . . .”23
In any event, once the Tribe had gathered, Deane set about negotiating for
the purchase of the two townships. In 1830, he writes: “A long conversation
ensued between us in which I endeavored to discover their price, and when I was
satisfied they had fixed no price among themselves, I named ten thousand dollars
and requested their answer.”24
Governor Attean wisely advised his people not to assent to these paltry
terms. Instead, the Tribe issued a counteroffer amounting to $69,120.00, based on
acreage.
Despite his unlimited purchasing authority, Deane declined on behalf of
the State. He departed Indian Island having failed—perhaps purposely, given his
carte blanche mandate—in his directive to acquire the two townships. Having the
benefit of historical hindsight, one must now wonder whether Deane’s refusal to
exercise his unlimited purchasing authority was, in fact, purposeful. His letter of
July 1830 confirms, at a minimum, that he had actual knowledge that a simple
See id.
See id.
19
In a letter dated July 20, 1830, Deane confirmed that his authority for purchase was unlimited:
“A recurrence to the Resolve and my instruction, will shew, there was no limitation in price.”
Letter from John G. Deane (July 20, 1830)(a copy of which was transcribed and a copy of which
is on file with historians Harald Prins and Bunny McBride).
20
Earlier that year, the Legislature voted to “authorize” the Penobscot to sell two of their four
townships with funds to be “invested for the benefit” of the tribes, but “no part” paid to them
directly. See URQUHART, supra note 10, at 45.
21
See Letter from Deane, supra note 22.
22
See DAWNLAND ENCOUNTERS: INDIANS AND EUROPEANS IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND 6 (Colin
G. Calloway ed., 1991).
23
Id.
24
Letter from Deane, supra note 22.
17
18
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majority of the Tribe was “disposed to sell, and some of them at fifty cents the
acre and less.”25 At the very least, the consequences of his decision (intentional or
no) set into motion a cascade of events that would eventually precipitate the
fracturing and division of the Penobscot people.
While Deane’s precise motivations for choosing not to exercise his
purchase power are likely forever lost to history, the certainty of the words he
penned in July 1830 are indisputable. Venturing well beyond the mandate of his
commission for a land purchase, Deane seemingly sua sponte set about
recommending a “Coercive System” targeted at subjugating the tribes to State
control. Deane’s System advocated for programs designed to keep the tribes
stationary throughout the year (i.e. no more migratory hunting), establishment of
State control of tribal affairs, the sale of tribal landholdings to fund State
“support” for the tribes, a conversion from subsistence hunting and gathering to
euroagrarian practices, and the division of communally held tribal lands into lots
held by individual tribal families.
It seems clear from these proposed measures—and Occam’s Razor
supports the conclusion—that Deane’s and the State’s ultimate purpose was to
divest the tribes of their communally-held sovereign lands. By alienating tribal
landholdings from the sovereign and putting title into individual hands, the State
saw a means of eventually facilitating transfer into the hands of white society
through transactional assimilation. From a legal perspective, once the lands were
under individual ownership, they were held in fee simple and therefore subject to
transfer. This is, of course, in diametric opposition to tribal practices in which
individual ownership of land was either rare or unpracticed. It is worth noting
that, ultimately, Maine pioneered a system eerily similar to that later adopted and
expanded by the federal government under the Dawes Act during its
dispossession of the tribes living in Oklahoma.
Critical contextual analysis of Deane’s “Coercive System” lays bare his
intent to impose a regime of political, social, and economic control aimed at
dispossessing the tribes and, eventually, assimilating them to the point of
extinction. Deane was a well-educated man and a graduate of Brown University.26
Ostensibly equipped with the intellectual acumen to conceive of the disparity
between his knowledge and his recommendations, there can be little dispute as to
Deane’s purpose. For, on the eve of dispossessing the tribes of the two townships,
Deane had a conversation with a priest who lived amongst the Penobscot. In that
conversation, Deane acknowledged that Penobscot were distinct from the mighty
Cherokee because, unlike the Cherokee, the Penobscot were still living on their
own land.27 In Deane’s own words:
Id.
See Prins, supra note 17, at 08:58.
27
See Pawling, supra note 8, at 07:24.
25
26
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Despite his unlimited purchasing authority, Deane declined on behalf of
the State. He departed Indian Island having failed—perhaps purposely, given his
carte blanche mandate—in his directive to acquire the two townships. Having the
benefit of historical hindsight, one must now wonder whether Deane’s refusal to
exercise his unlimited purchasing authority was, in fact, purposeful. His letter of
July 1830 confirms, at a minimum, that he had actual knowledge that a simple
majority of the Tribe was “disposed to sell, and some of them at fifty cents the
acre and less.”28 At the very least, the consequences of his decision (intentional or
no) set into motion a cascade of events that would eventually precipitate the
fracturing and division of the Penobscot people.
While Deane’s precise motivations for choosing not to exercise his
purchase power are likely forever lost to history, the certainty of the words he
penned in July 1830 are indisputable. Venturing well beyond the mandate of his
commission for a land purchase, Deane seemingly sua sponte set about
recommending a “Coercive System” targeted at subjugating the tribes to State
control. Deane’s System advocated for programs designed to keep the tribes
stationary throughout the year (i.e. no more migratory hunting), establishment of
State control of tribal affairs, the sale of tribal landholdings to fund State
“support” for the tribes, a conversion from subsistence hunting and gathering to
euroagrarian practices, and the division of communally held tribal lands into lots
held by individual tribal families.
It seems clear from these proposed measures—and Occam’s Razor
supports the conclusion—that Deane’s and the State’s ultimate purpose was to
divest the tribes of their communally-held sovereign lands. By alienating tribal
landholdings from the sovereign and putting title into individual hands, the State
saw a means of eventually facilitating transfer into the hands of white society
through transactional assimilation. From a legal perspective, once the lands were
under individual ownership, they were held in fee simple and therefore subject to
transfer. This is, of course, in diametric opposition to tribal practices in which
individual ownership of land was either rare or unpracticed. It is worth noting
that, ultimately, Maine pioneered a system eerily similar to that later adopted and
expanded by the federal government under the Dawes Act during its
dispossession of the tribes living in Oklahoma.
Critical contextual analysis of Deane’s “Coercive System” lays bare his
intent to impose a regime of political, social, and economic control aimed at
dispossessing the tribes and, eventually, assimilating them to the point of
extinction. Deane was a well-educated man and a graduate of Brown University. 29
Ostensibly equipped with the intellectual acumen to conceive of the disparity
28
29

Id.
See Prins, supra note 17, at 08:58.

The situation of the [Penobscot] Indians is peculiar
not merely as it relates to the mode in which they
have been treated by the government since the
settlement of New England, but as it relates to
themselves.28
The “peculiarity” to which Deane was referring was that, dissimilar to the
lion’s share of the eastern tribes that failed in their resistance to dispossession, the
Penobscot retained genuine, ancestral title to their lands.29
In the years that followed Deane’s failed attempt to acquire the townships,
illegal cutting gangs began to fell timber located on Penobscot islands in the
River.30 The Penobscot faced an equal threat to their lands from the increasing
encroachments of sawmills installed along the length of the Penobscot River as
territories were acquired for lumbering activity via sales commissioned by the
State’s Indian Agents—often without the knowledge or consent of the tribes.31
The hunt for “Indian Gold”—or, land—was on and in full force. While the State
persisted in coveting the four townships under the likely guise of their militaristic
importance but surely for their proximity to valuable timberlands, private
individuals with criminal designs tried to swindle the tribes out of their timber
rights—sometimes even going so far as to impersonate Native American dress
and to draft clearly fraudulent “documentation” of their timber rights.32
By 1833, the State of Maine was tired of waiting. It wanted the issue of
the Four Townships “settled” once for all.33 The State commissioned yet another
envoy to attempt to negotiate a purchase from the Penobscot Tribe and sent
lumber baron Amos Roberts—one of eighteen original members of the first

Letter from Deane, supra note 22.
See Pawling, supra note 8, at 07:24.
30
See Prins, supra note 17, at 30:13.
31
See id.; DONALD SOCTOMAH, SAVE THE LAND FOR THE CHILDREN 1800-1850:
PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBAL LIFE AND TIMES IN MAINE AND NEW BRUNSWICK 98-99 (2009)(citing
Eastport Sentinel February 7, 1834).
32
See id.
33
See URQUHART, supra note 10, at 45.
28
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commercial lumbering franchise, the Penobscot Boom34—and his associate Judge
Thomas Bartlett, to acquire “such of the lands belonging to the Penobscot Tribe as
they might be disposed to sell.”35 Of course, Roberts and Bartlett likely carried
with them instructions to see to it that the reluctant Penobscot were “disposed to
sell” all four townships.
What happened next is the subject of much historical conjecture, debate,
and disagreement. According to the State, Roberts and Bartlett negotiated the
purchase of the Four Townships for $50,000—a sum paid to the Tribe by bond of
the Legislature on June 10, 1833.36 No one, including the State or the
commissioners, would later claim that this price was fair market value for the land
in question—the shared perception on both sides was that it was not.
The Penobscot bemoaned the sale as fraudulent. Historians today have
pieced together the general narrative of what transpired between Roberts, Bartlett,
and the Tribe. Rather than taking Deane’s more “diplomatic” approach and
negotiating terms, Roberts and Bartlett are believed to have engaged in backroom
“politicking,” interfering with tribal leadership to fraudulently obtain the
signatures of fifteen Penobscot members, including Governor John Attean and
Lieutenant Governor John Neptune. Having acquired the marks, Roberts and
Bartlett returned to Augusta believing and/or professing that they had obtained a
legal release of the land, but as this Remonstrance has discussed, Wabanaki
cultural practices did not imbue tribal leaders with absolute authority to agree to
any such transaction without the consent of a majority of tribal members in a
General Meeting.37
The “Theft of the Four Townships,” as the Penobscot later referred to it,
ignited a firestorm of protest from the Tribe, forcing John Neptune to travel to
As a matter of necessity, lumbering required lumberjacks to float logs down the river so that
they could be processed, surveyed, purchased, and shipped at a central point of processing.
Because each log bore a “blaze” or owner’s mark to identify the company who had felled it,
lumbermen needed a system for sorting the timber at various checkpoints. ALFRED GEER
HEMPSTEAD, THE PENOBSCOT BOOM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST BRANCH OF THE
PENOBSCOT RIVER FOR LOG DRIVING 1825-1931 15 (1975). The checkpoints—referred to in the
industry as “booms”—were strategically placed along waterways at points where large quantities
of timber would accumulate before being passed through—like a riverine highway of sorts. In the
Penobscot River, the most logical sorting location was a point just above the final destination of
the logs at the Old Town sawmill. It was here that the Penobscot Boom was erected. Id. at 15
[citing H.K. BARROWS & C.C. BABB, WATER RESOURCES OF THE PENOBSCOT RIVER BASIN,
MAINE 8, 13 (1912)].
35
NEIL ROLDE, UNSETTLED PAST, UNSETTLED FUTURE: THE STORY OF MAINE INDIANS 191
(2004).
36
The Proctor Report on Maine Indians, Final Report to the Maine Legislative Research
Committee of the 90th Legislature 18 (Sept. 1942)(hereinafter “the Proctor Report”).
37
To date, no tribal law can be enacted unless a general assembly of all tribal members of the tribe
have given their assent. This cultural mandate has existed for millennia and certainly predated
euromerican intercourse with the tribes.
34
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Augusta in the winter of 1833-1834 to lead a delegation for the purposes of
delivering unto the Legislature a Remonstrance of the fraudulent transaction.38
Neptune and the Penobscot Delegation appealed to the Legislature, arguing that a
“certain deed fraudulently obtained in June last from a few individuals without the
knowledge or consent of the tribe” should be nullified.39 When the State Senate
convened in January to hear the matter, it considered several documents as
evidence of the parties’ claims, including: a brief report by Roberts and Bartlett
addressed to the State, a motion from the Governor’s Council approving the
commissioners’ work, a deed to the land in question bearing the alleged
signatures of fifteen Penobscot members, and the Tribe’s Remonstrance which,
importantly, was signed by some of the very same names appearing on the deed in
question.40
The Penobscot Remonstrance—bearing the signatures of forty-two tribal
members—alleged that the commissioners (specifically naming Bartlett and one
“Lovejoy”—a party of interest known to have previously attempted to purchase
the townships as Deane had) had never explained the true nature of the
transaction; had forced the Penobscot signatories to sign the deed under duress;
and that the land had been acquired for far less than fair market value.41 Despite
openly acknowledging how “ably written” the Tribe’s Remonstrance was,
lawmakers refused to question the integrity of Roberts and Bartlett—even when
held against these commissioners’ meager statement of facts. Incensed at a
perceived attempt to defame the “good name” of the commissioners, the
Legislature rejected the Penobscot’s’ plea to withdraw from the “sale agreement”
brokered by Roberts and Bartlett.

38
A transcript of the original Remonstrance of June 1833 is included under Appendix B, along
with a photograph of the marks of the original signatories thereto.
39
Trafton, Mark and Penobscot Nation, "1833-06-18 Two petitions from the Penobscot Tribe
against the illegal sale of their land" (1833). Documents. 50.
https://digitalmaine.com/native_tribal_docs/50
40
Id.
41
Id. It is worth noting, as further supporting evidence of this widely-accepted fact, that the land in
question continued to have immense value throughout Maine’s history due to the natural resources
located thereupon. One of the townships—Township 3—would later act as a keystone to the
success of establishing the Great Northern Paper Company in the late 19th century as it sat atop a
major hydroelectric power source sufficient to power the paper manufacturer. NEIL ROLDE, THE
INTERRUPTED FOREST: A HISTORY OF MAINE’S WILDLANDS 279 (2002).
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B. The Lumber Boom and Maine’s Rise to Economic Dominance
Indian land was the gold of the 19th Century. Reflecting thereupon, U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch once remarked that “the wildest
speculation that has ever prevailed in any part of the United States was in the
Timberlands of Maine.” Indeed, there is considerable truth to Secretary
McCulloch’s observations given that lumber was at times regarded as legal tender
and “would buy any goods and pay any debts.” 42 In the earlier days of its history,
Maine—known even to this day as the most heavily forested state in the United
States—was overflowing with timber.
The earliest indicator of significant efforts to export timber en masse was
in 1816—“the year without a summer”—during which lumber yields reached
approximately 1,000,000 feet of timber processed through Bangor.43 Yields
slowly continued to increase per annum through 1822, at which time
Massachusetts lumbermen began to enter the Penobscot River Basin to partake in
the “wood rush.” By 1831, lumber mills in present-day Penobscot County yielded
approximately 30,000,000 feet.44 As stunning indicator of just how abundant
Maine’s pine forests were, despite these increases in lumbering, by 1832 there
was still merchantable pine standing on the Penobscot River within the present
limits of the city of Bangor.45
Describing the rapidly changing landscape surrounding Bangor and Old
Town at this time, historian Micah Pawling paints a vivid picture of the Penobscot
River Valley during this period and the deleterious effects that increased
lumbering was having on the environment:
By the 1830s this waterscape, altered by various
wing dams, had emerged as the hub of lumbering
activities on the largest watershed within the borders
of Maine. At the falls, several sawmills hummed with
activity as flowing water powered the saws that cut
logs into boards, shingles, laths, clapboards, and
other wood products for market. Dams and sawmills
also impeded canoe travel and deterred anadromous
fish from spawning upriver. Moreover, the tons of
sawdust discharged into the Penobscot River caused
a decline of oxygen levels in the water, further
degrading the rich fishery upon which the
Penobscots depended for their livelihood. From
ROLDE, supra note 44, at 232.
DEFEBAUGH, supra note 14, at 52.
44
Id. The reader may be interested to note that by the mid-nineteenth century there were already
approximately 250 lumber mills along the shores of the Penobscot River alone. AMERICAN
FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, A RESOURCE BOOK ABOUT PENOBSCOT, PASSAMAQUODDY,
MALISEET, MICMAC AND ABENAKI INDIANS A-10 (1989).
45
Id.
42
43
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April to September numerous log booms just north
of Old Town Island changed the riverscape into a sea
of floating logs as far as the eye could see, forever
changing the Penobscot River. Boom piers or
cribwork in the river that directed or sorted logs
changed the flow of the river, emphasizing one
channel over another. The river current, carrying an
extra weight that increased its force, beached floating
timber on the reservation islands, transforming the
shorelines and threatening to separate the Indigenous
inhabitants from the river.46
To the tribes who, for thousands of years had been faithful stewards of the
land and its renewable resources, the explosion of industrial activity and the
insatiable appetite of the lumber companies for the consumption of land was
apocalyptic. Such fears are powerfully captured by the accounts of tribal officials
during the early 1830’s, published in newspapers of the time. As one example, a
Passamaquoddy Indian attempted to alert the public of the State’s attempts to
satisfy its increasing lust for land through the vigilante actions of its Indian
Agents:
Why should an agent of the government totally
disregard his instructions and assume the
responsibility of managing the property of the
Natives as he may choose? When the present agent
came into power . . . [h]e found an account from the
former agent and the trespassers for the value of
fifteen hundred dollars . . . [and evidence that] each
year the agent wrote more permits than the law
allowed.47
A similar account from yet another member of the Tribe around the same
period bemoans the State’s breach of its fiduciary duty to the tribes through its
failure to protect and subsequent regulations of the sale of Native lumber through
the Indian Agents:
If the Maine Governor intended that the agent shall
permit timber to be cut off the Township at will, why
is he not instructed to obtain the fair rate for timber
on Indian land? Had the timber cut off the present
winter been fairly put into the market, there would
Micah A. Pawling, A 'Labyrinth of Uncertainties' - Penobscot River Islands, Land Assignments,
and Indigenous Women, 42:4 AMER. INDIAN Q. 454, 458-59 (2018).
47
SOCTOMAH, supra note 34, at 98-99 (citing Eastport Sentinel February 7, 1834).
46
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have been $2 to $3 might have been obtained for
pine. As few townships possess greater advantages
for logging than this, it being ease of access at all
times, with abundance of hay in the area and having
only a short distance to drive. Had the right course
been followed $6,000 might have been raised. The
agent may say that the nine oxen teams and cutters
are nearly all trespassers without permits. If the agent
had visited the area early in the year he could have
stopped the trespass. If all the transactions of ther
[sic] agent be laid before the State Governor and his
council, it is believed that a different exhibition
would be presented than now it appears. It is hoped
that the property may be secured for the native
Passamaquoddy Tribe.48
It is worth pointing out that, once again, the failure of the State to honor its
fiduciary duty to the Passamaquoddy Tribe was a precursor of the federal
government’s failure to honor its fiduciary duties to the tribes.49
There seemed to be no corner of Indian land that the State either hadn’t
claimed, stolen, purchased, or leased away against the tribes’ protests. Indeed, not
even the grass atop the increasingly barren islands was safe, as Indian Agents
began leasing rights to lumbermen for conversion to hay to feed their draft
animals during winter operations.50
Maine’s liquidation of its public land holdings—many of which had
originally been reserved under the State Constitution for the benefit of education
and religious organizations—was proof positive that if the lumber industry were
to continue to grow (and Maine to continue to be an economic force) access to
more land was necessary. At a time when Bangor was being touted as a “jewel in
the North,” the State had no plans to allow the barons—and therefore Maine’s
economy—to fail.
So, in 1842, Maine began its campaign to push and facilitate the
privatization and commodification of its public lands. By act of the Legislature,
control was taken from the Land Agents and handed over to county

Id.
Maine’s willful breach of its fiduciary duty to the tribes was later emulated by the federal
government when the Bureau of Indian affairs mismanaged and failed to properly provide an
accounting of land allotments and interests held in trust for the benefit of the tribes and members
thereof (leasing tracts with valuable timber and mineral mining rights for far less than market
value). The tribes were successful in levying a class action lawsuit in which the federal
government ended up having to remit approximately $1.5 billion for breach of fiduciary duty.
Class Action Settlement Agreement, Cobell et al v. Salazar et al, (D.C. Cir. 2010)(1:96CV01285JR).
50
See RICHARD G. WOOD, A HISTORY OF LUMBERING IN MAINE 1820-1861 17 (1961).
48
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commissioners who were, three years later, authorized to grant permits to cut
timber on the reserved lots and in unincorporated townships. 51

Maine was precariously balancing many spinning plates in the air. It was
desperate to sustain the lumber boom which had been a boon to settlement of the
northern counties, the barons thirsted for legal channels to consume as much land
as possible, and the Penobscot Tribe—divided since the “Theft of the Four
Townships”—continued to see their lands alienated under predatory economic
policies and gambits. Maine felt an increasing panic and need not only to “open
up” channels for further dispossession of what little tribal lands remained, but
more importantly to lend legitimacy to its past bad acts. As Maine struggled to
keep the boom alive, the powers at hand embarked upon a quest to sow the seeds
of an illegitimate lineage of legal precedent to support their illegitimate empire.
It marked the beginning to a system of predatory economics masquerading
as law.

PART III:
A CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF MAINE INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE
IV.

PREDATORY ECONOMICS MASQUERADING AS LAW:
THE TOXIC PRECEDENT SET BY MURCH V. TOMER (1842)

“You whites make all the ammunition.”
— Mahpíya-lúta (or, “Chief Red Cloud”) (1822-1909 A.D.)
Under its push to privatize, Maine had a serious problem when it came to
the tribes: they did not want to sell their land. Despite the seemingly indomitable
will of the tribes to retain possession of what little lands they retained, private
land owners in Maine—particularly those living in riverine townships in the
vicinity of the islands—“. . .repeatedly expressed a desire that [the Penobscots’
Islands] may be purchased.” 52 Despite efforts by the 4th Legislature to fund the
See id., at 54 (citing Maine House Doc., 1847, #20. Com. On State Lands and Roads, p. 2).
The Proctor Report on Maine Indians, supra note 39 (citing “Maine Governor’s Annual
Message” 1826).

51
52
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purchase of said islands by passing a Resolve to fund the tribes’ dispossession, the
tribes held strong and the Resolve remained unexecuted.
It is against this historical background that a Penobscot man named Peol
Tomer would set into motion events that would ripple throughout time as the
foundation for Maine’s toxic Indian jurisprudence.
The Law Court’s 1842 decision in Murch v. Tomer53 is, perhaps, facially
innocuous. Indeed, even as recently as 2015, some legal scholars have heralded
Murch as a protectorate of Maine’s supposed guarantee of Lockean natural
rights.54 In truth, however, Murch is a case that when critically examined quickly
reveals itself to be one in which the Court grossly abuses its discretion by
traveling well beyond the justiciable controversy before it and, in so doing, relies
upon a judicial fiction to create precedent deleterious to tribal sovereignty. At the
same time Murch supposedly conveys Lockean rights upon tribal members, it
minimizes Native Americans’ ability to exercise those rights, claiming that they
suffer from “imbecility.”55
Murch is problematic not simply because it is of the ilk of Korematsu or
Plessy, but because it serves as toxic progenitor to the later-described and highly
injurious Newell case. Serving as the foundation of all future Maine Indian
jurisprudence, Murch is the bad seed from which would forever grow fruit of the
poisonous tree.
A. Facts and Background
Murch is strange in that there is very little surviving contextual detail to
describe exactly why and how the parties ended up before Chief Justice Ezekiel
Whitman and the Law Court. What is apparent is that the case is based upon a
dispute over a promissory note executed by Peol Tomer and tendered to Charles
Murch.56 No description of Murch is given, nor does the opinion specify the terms
of the note. Only by reviewing the handwritten case file were the authors able to
determine that Tomer’s note was executed on April 13, 1837, to one Charles
Murch of Passadumkeag, in the amount of $32.50.57 It is strange that a legal
action would be taken against Peol Tomer both in light of his status as a Tribal
Representative (all of whose costs were expensed to the State) and since all debts
incurred by tribal members for necessary expenses were paid by the State via a
voucher system.
Murch v. Tomer, 21 Me. 535 (1842).
See Steven G. Calabresi & SofÍa M. Vickery, On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Understanding of Lockean Natural Rights, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1299, 1359 (2015)(internal
citations omitted).
55
Murch, 21 Me. at 538.
56
Id. at 535.
57
Promissory Note Executed by Peol Tomer, Murch v. Tomer, 21 Me. 535 (1842).
53
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Although this history lends some confidence to the correct identity of
Tomer, little is known about Charles Murch. That Murch sought enforcement of
Tomer’s note is never explicitly stated or confirmed, and must be inferred by the
legal status of the parties. Further, the authors were able to discern little to nothing
about Murch personally, other than the unverifiable anecdote that he may have
been a physician.
Despite the gaps inherent in Murch, the little-known information is largely
irrelevant. Given the grave departure from the subject matter of the case
endeavored by the Court, whether Murch was about a promissory note against
land or a contract for the purchase of a mere peppercorn makes little difference.
B. Procedural Posture
From the opinion, we similarly derive precious little information about the
procedural posture of Murch. We learn that Tomer (defined as “an Indian of the
Penobscot [T]ribe”) was represented by “Cony & Sewall”—ostensibly a law firm
or two co-counselors.58 Murch was represented by “J. Appleton and Randall.”59
Apparently, upon Murch’s complaint to Tomer, Tomer’s attorneys furnished no
defense.60 Pre-suit, the parties agreed to stipulated facts stating that the action was
upon a note signed by Tomer and “that [Tomer] was at the time of signing it, and
still is, an Indian of the Penobscot Tribe.”61 Last, the parties stipulated as to an
application of law, agreeing that “if action could be maintained against the
defendant, he being an Indian as aforesaid, he was to be defaulted; and if not, the
plaintiff was to become nonsuit.”62 By consent of counsel, Murch was originally
continued nisi under an agreement that it should be decided upon the submission
of briefs to the Court.63 Neither counsel, however, submitted briefs, and the matter
was brought before the Court with written arguments never having been made.64
C. Holding and Analysis
At issue in Murch—by stipulation of the parties—was whether Tomer “by
his reason of being [an] Indian” could enter into legal contracts under the law and
therefore be held liable for breach upon the same.
At the outset, Justice Whitman dives headlong into a discourse on natural
rights and whether Native Americans are endowed with the absolute title to their
Murch, 21 Me. at 535.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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ancestral lands. In so doing, he concludes that although the Native Americans
were legally dispossessed by European colonization, the Constitution
contemplates that they might be voters if taxed and, therefore, should not differ
from American citizens:
The aborigines of this country were its ancient
proprietors. But, emigrants from Europe having
obtained a foothold here, and having increased in
numbers, till their power had greatly transcended that
of the natives, they at length assumed entire control
over them: till it has become settled law, that even
the territory and soil of the small districts, to which
they are now reduced, in their occupation, is not
absolutely theirs in fee. They are prohibited from
alienating: and even the use and improvement is not
left to their entire control . . . Our constitution seems
to contemplate that, under certain circumstances,
they may become voters at our elections. It only
excludes such from voting, as are not taxed: thereby
implying, if taxed, that they may be voters. Our
constitution moreover says that ‘all men shall be born
equally free and independent’…why then, should an
Indian differ from that of other individuals born and
reared upon our own soils?65
Relying on the State’s establishment of Indian Agents for the management
of Indian “property,” Whitman infers that control thereof was only intended to be
exerted over real estate and not personal property of tribal members. Without
citing precedent to support his conclusions, Justice Whitman declares that
although Indians might be considered citizens with rights incident to ownership
and contracting of personal property, they are “imbecilic” and incapable of
possessing natural rights to own and govern their land as a collective sovereign:
Although endowed with the attributes belonging to
our species, and in fact, a portion of the human race,
and born within our borders, and by the terms of our
constitution having seemingly an inalienable right to
the acquisition and control of property; yet, as a
people, and as it were nationally and collectively,
65
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they are treated, and perhaps necessarily so to a
certain extent at least, as having none of those
attributes. Imbecility on their part, and the dictates of
humanity on ours, have necessarily prescribed to
them their subjection to our paternal control; in
disregard of some, at least, of abstract principles of
the rights of man. To the extent to which our laws go
in abridging them of their supposed natural right,
ordinarily incident to the ownership of property, we
must consider them individually and collectively as
under our tutelage. As the regulations before stated
are in derogation of personal rights, however, we
must not ex-tend them beyond what is obviously
prescribed.66
Essentially, Justice Whitman concludes that tribal lands are “individually
and collectively . . . under the tutelage” of the State of Maine. A clear abruption of
then-contemporary federal precedent, this runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s
opinions expressed in what has become known as the Marshall Trilogy.67
Whitman’s opinion is problematic for several reasons. First, he several
times refers to the State Constitution but makes no mention of Maine’s
obligations incident the 1820 Treaty just 21 years earlier. Acknowledgement of
such would show, as would the Maine Indian Land Claims Settlement nearly 140
years later, that entertaining the Articles of Separation and the 1820 Treaty in the
first place was, at a bare minimum, a tacit recognition of tribal sovereignty. But
the analysis goes deeper. Prior to his career as Chief Justice, Whitman was a
Representative to Congress for the Commonwealth. A federalist, legal scholar,
and a member of the very framers who drafted the Maine Constitution, Whitman
was doubtless aware of Maine’s obligations incident the Articles of Separation as
they pertained to the tribes. Indeed, even if it could genuinely be contended that
Whitman was somehow ignorant of this fact based on personal experience alone,
he would have had no excuse for overlooking the treaty obligations included in
the pre-text of the Maine Constitution as published just one year prior in 1841.

Murch, 21 Me. at 538.
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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In basing his largely contradictory analysis on pseudo-citizenship rights
(inclusive of the right to own private property and enter into contracts) held
against a distinct class
of rights incident to
That Murch appears to have been predicated upon a
tribal sovereignty,
legal fiction for the purposes of manipulating the
Whitman leaves
judicial system for the establishment of pre-determined
exposed the house of
precedents serving State interests supports the theory
cards atop which the
that this was nothing more than predatory economics
Court’s “logic” rests.
Put plainly, the issue in masquerading as law.
Murch—whether
Tomer could be held
liable on the promissory note—did not require an analysis of his status as a tribal
member any more than it would if Tomer was a foreign national.
Whitman created a legal fiction by making this the central issue of the
case and failing to correct the bizarre stipulation of the parties.
Similarly irregular were the actions of Tomer’s counsel. Why, if it was
common knowledge that the Tribe has been a party to a treaty just 21 years earlier
and, therefore, was cloaked with the recognition of sovereignty, would Tomer’s
attorneys argue that his status as an Indian somehow bore on his ability to make a
valid contract? Would not they have agreed that a Frenchman or Canadian had the
ability to enter into transactions of foreign commerce? Furthermore, what of the
fact that the State of Maine—incident to its treaty obligations assumed from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts—paid for tribal members’ food and living
expenses? Given this, it makes little sense why Peol Tomer—both a Penobscot
Indian and a Tribal Representative—would enter litigation over a promissory note
when, in fact, the State voucher system providing for necessary expenses of tribal
members would have paid the amount in controversy.
It begs the question of whether Murch was “set up” with a question that
didn’t need to be answered for the purpose of engaging in a pre-determined
discourse serving the instrumental ends of the State and its political elite. This, of
course, is further supported by the fact that the Murch Court fails even to provide
an enumerated remedy to Murch after finding in his favor. It’s as if once the
precedent was set, nothing else mattered.
That Murch appears to have been predicated upon a legal fiction for the
purposes of manipulating the judicial system for the establishment of a concocted
precedent to serve State interests supports the theory that this was nothing more
than predatory economics masquerading as law. In hindsight, Murch almost
serves the State’s dual imperatives too perfectly to be pure coincidence.
By 1842 Maine lusted to acquire as much land as possible to feed the
Lumber Boom. Despite significant interest by the State and local municipalities in
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acquiring the Penobscot’s islands in the river, the Tribe had been uninterested in
selling. It would be a shocking coincidence if Murch and its mandate for
legitimizing the alienation and subsequent liquidation of tribal lands held by tribal
members just so happened to coincide with the State’s push for privatization of
lands. The far more likely reality is that Murch represents a conscious attempt by
Maine to “have its cake and eat it too” with regard to engorging itself with tribal
land resources while simultaneously derogating the rights of indigenous people. It
is through this dichotomy that the fallacy of Murch is laid bare.
Not only is Murch based upon a legal fiction, but it is an irrational
decision that confuses the legal capacity thrust upon the tribes by the State. At the
signing of the 1820 Treaty, Maine endeavored to establish a guardianship
relationship with the tribes, with the State serving as guardian and the tribes as
wards. Seeming to acknowledge this, Whitman’s “although endowed” soliloquy
recognizes tribal members as individuals with natural rights incident to owning
property while, in the same breath, designating tribal nations—those sovereign
bodies comprised of these same tribal members to which he just prescribed
property rights—as incompetent. The illogical conclusion of Murch is so stated:
when tribal members own land and property as individuals, they inherently have
capacity, but tribal nations—being collective “children” and wards—lack the
same. In so holding, Murch impermissibly creates a “floating standard” for
capacity that is at odds with the State’s then-perceived relationship with the tribes.
According to Murch, tribal members had sufficient capacity to contract, but their
body politic, being wards of the State, collectively lacked the same. These
determinations of capacity are logically at odds.
In sum, Murch is fairly characterized as a color of law case in which
Justice Whitman “traveled outside of his case” similar to that lamented of Chief
Justice John Marshall by former President Thomas Jefferson following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh.68 Stretching the fabric of
credulity past its breaking point when he made a simple contract claim an
investigation of the nature of Indian’s Lockean Natural Rights, Whitman and the
Murch Court were “legislating from the bench” in a decision that both promoted
the State’s interest in divesting individual tribal members of their land and
eroding sovereignty by putting the rights of the individual above the community,
all the while outright disregarding federal Indian law, ignoring the sovereign
status accorded to tribal governments, laying the foundation for the further
erosion of federal Indian law, and creating their own Indian jurisprudence
In a letter bemoaning the opinion, Thomas Jefferson complained bitterly that the "practice of
John Marshall, of travelling out of his case to prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not
before the court, is very irregular and censurable." Jefferson to William Johnson, June 12, 1823.
Cf. A Virginian's 'Amphictyon' Essays in Gerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense of
McCulloch v. Maryland 55 (Stanford U. Press, 1969); see generally M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
68
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culminating in MICSA in 1980—a devastating piece of legislation designed to
further isolate, control and eliminate the tribes by, inter alia, making them the
legal equivalent of a municipality.69
As damaging as Murch was for the tribes, its true destructive force would
not be felt until 50 years hence, when it would serve as foundational precedent for
Newell—the most hostile case in Maine Indian jurisprudence.70
D. Stranger Than (Legal) Fiction: The Curious Case of Johnson v.
M’Intosh—Analogue of Fraud or Stunning Coincidence?
As a matter of both fact and finding, comparisons between Murch and the
infamous Supreme Court decision in M’Intosh are warranted given the similarities
shared by these two cases. From a factual standpoint, both Murch and M’Intosh
are “Indian law” cases that adjudicate the rights of Native Americans having
transacted with non-tribal citizens. In reaching this issue, however, both M’Intosh
and Murch had to widely “travel outside of the case,” as Jefferson put it. Neither
the Court in M’Intosh nor in Murch were presented with the legal question of
whether Native Americans have a right to transact, but both courts nevertheless
hacked out a rough path to reach this analysis, as discussed infra. In the case of
M’Intosh, modern legal scholars have identified several facts tending to prove that
the case was a sham—consciously and purposely staged to facilitate a contrived
holding.
Far less discussed than the Supreme Court precedent set in M’Intosh,
forensic legal analysis of Murch is nevertheless indicative of similar fraudulent
roots. As discussed infra, modern critical analysis of the Supreme Court’s
decision in M’Intosh offers a potentially eye-opening cause for comparison to
Murch and, startlingly, anecdotal evidence suggesting that, like M’Intosh, Murch
was a fraudulent case.

MICSA is a pariah in the world of American Indian Law, as it imposes a quasi-municipal status
upon the tribes, rather than adopting/implementing the standard “nation-to-nation”
acknowledgements between the sovereign federal government, states, and tribes located elsewhere
in the United States. For example, the Supreme Court, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
characterized indigenous tribes as “domestic dependent nations.” 31 U.S. at 2; see also Worcester,
31 U.S. at 519 (“The words ‘treaty’ and ‘nation’ are words of our own language, selected in our
diplomatic and legislative proceedings by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood
meaning. We have applied them to Indians as we have applied them to the other nations of the
earth. They are applied to all in the same sense”).
70
It is, perhaps, also interesting to note that the United States would also follow suit to Murch. By
Act of March 3, 1875, the Homestead act was amended so that “Indians abandoning tribal
relations were given right of homestead, though not permitted to dispose of the land until after five
years from issuance of the patent, retaining, however, a tribal interest in annuities and other
funds.” JAMES ELLIOTT DEFEBAUGH, HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY OF AMERICA, VOL. 1,
385 (1906).
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A cornerstone of American property law, M’Intosh was founded upon a
dispute between two American landowners who had been deeded what the parties
alleged was the same plot of land.71 The “controversy” at hand arose when one
party obtained title as conveyed to him by the British Crown prior to the
American Revolution. The other obtained title as sold to him in a direct
transaction with the Piankeshaw Tribe living in Virginia. Despite what appears,
facially, to be a competent controversy between two landowners, contemporary
analysis of history of the legal proceedings in M’Intosh supports the conclusion
that the supposed dispute between the two parties was “collusive and
manufactured.”72
There is a growing body of legal scholarship that supports the M’Intosh
fraud theory. One such scholar, professor Eric Kades, claims that even without
diving into a complex analysis of the case, it is clear that it has fraudulent roots.
According to Kades, it was quite literally impossible that the two landowners in
M’Intosh could have had a dispute over a single contested parcel of land when, in
fact, the two deeds at issue were for two distinct tracts of land more than 50 miles
apart from one another.73 Fellow legal scholar Lindsay G. Robertson also
contends that “Johnson v. M’Intosh was the result of the two sides committing a
fraud upon the Court.”74
Ultimately, Robertson’s thesis that M’Intosh was a fabrication is borne out
by historical procedural fact. Attorney Robert Goodloe Harper—hired to represent
the interests of the land companies—did contrive an agreed statement of fact to
direct and constrain the justiciable controversies before the Court; Harper did
employ fellow attorney Daniel Webster as co-counsel in this matter and, together,
they “hired” the defense attorneys; and arguing before the Court, Harper and
Webster did employ a beneficent façade recognizing indigenous land rights as a
means of shuffling the Court along to their desired controversy. But for Chief
Justice Marshall’s other plans, Harper’s fraudulent case clearly would have
succeeded, given his success in “setting up” the issue before the Court. His
downfall was in failing to anticipate the ways in which a rogue Chief Justice
might use the contrived case to meet his own instrumental ends.
This was a valuable lesson for Harper. And for Webster, who would later
“pop up” at a most curious time in Maine jurisprudence.

See generally M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
STEVEN T. NEWCOMB, PAGANS IN THE PROMISED LAND: DECODING THE DOCTRINE OF
CHRISTIAN DISCOVERY, 75-76 (2008)(internal citations omitted).
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Having drawn upon the forensic analysis of Robertson, the comparative
analysis with Murch yields stark similarities between the two cases that are eerily
reflective of one another. First and foremost, like M’Intosh, the parties in Murch
agreed to a stipulated statement of fact that had direct bearing on the justiciable
controversy before the Court for its decision.
Dated “Jan. of the year 1841,” the Stipulated Statement of Fact reads:
Charles Murch vs. Peol Tomer
Dist Court- Eastern Dis
Jan. of the year 1841
In the above action the parties agree to the following
statement of facts—the action is on a note of hand by
the defendant and payable to the plaintiff. The
defendant is an Indian of the Penobscot Tribe—If the
defendant is not liable to the action in consequence
of him being an Indian, and if he can take the
objection at this time in any form of pleading, then
the plaintiff agrees to become nonsuit, the endorser
of the writ out of the holding, otherwise the
defendant agrees to be defaulted.75
Here, we see that counsel for both parties—including those for Tomer,
who are under a fiduciary duty to protect his legal interests—establishing the
factual and legal parameters around which the case will be decided: the defendant
is an Indian, and whether or not he is defaulted on his promissory note is
dependent thereupon. In a shocking concession of their client’s legal rights
reminiscent of the contrived stipulations in M’Intosh, counsel for Tomer
constrains itself to arguing and defending on one issue, forgoing the entire
universe of potential alternative defenses that might prevail.
It is worth noting that, at the same time the attorneys for the parties in
Murch were coming to their agreement, Daniel Webster was prominent and active
in the Maine Bar. Around this same time period, Webster was not only licensed to
practice law in Maine, but he partook in high-profile land rights cases bearing on
tracts coveted by the lumber barons and once under the protection of the tribes.
As an example, around this time, Webster represented General Samuel Veazie in
a claim prosecuted by the law firm Wadleigh and Purinton and even conducted
75
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direct examination of John Neptune.76 Perhaps more notably, however, was
Daniel Webster’s presence in Maine during 1842—the same year Murch was
decided.
During the period of time that the Aroostook War was being waged on
paper against the English in British-occupied Canada (it being a “war of words”),
Webster was called upon to represent the United States in settling the
international boundary in northern Maine. Together with Alexander Baring of
England, Webster negotiated what later became known as the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty.77 Of course, Webster’s involvement in this, as in M’Intosh, is not immune
from speculation that his dealings were less than transparent. During negotiations
and at a time when Webster was having immense difficulty getting Americans to
support a compromise with Britain, there was a “fortuitous discovery . . . of a map
that purported to show a boundary line drawn by Benjamin Franklin during the
Paris peace talks in 1783 that helped assuage American feelings.”78 Following this
miraculous discovery, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty was signed in August
1842.79 Just two months prior, in June of 1842, counsel for the parties in Murch
agreed to continue proceedings nisi so that the case could “be argued in
writing.”80
It is here that the confluence of Maine lumbering history, counsel’s
reliance upon stipulated facts, and Daniel Webster’s prominence in the Maine Bar
during 1842 forms a compelling nexus of incentive and resulting policy: in the
face of an expanding industry and demand for timber, Maine needed to “open” up
any lands it could, including those held by the tribes or individuals thereof.
Indeed, by 1842 “. . . pine was still the lumberman’s prize, and Maine was the last
place in the Northeast where it grew commercially viable stands. They were long
gone from the state’s southern forests, but up north woodsmen could find the
immense trunks of old and in wonderful quantity. Only the disputed border had
prevented them from being exploited with confidence [by Maine].”81 Murch,
having been decided during this fateful year, falls directly in tandem with the
signing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty—the certainty gained therefrom which
“uncorked a flood of optimism” in speculation and began to reverse a declining
trend in land sales, which had reached a nadir the prior year.82 Indeed, the same
summer the Treaty was signed, Maine saw a flurry of “advertisements for saws,
axes, and other woods-related stuff [fill] the pages of Bangor’s broadsheets.”83
See ROLDE, supra note 38, at 219.
See URQUHART, supra note 10, at 69.
78
Id.
79
See id.
80
Murch, 21 Me. at 535.
81
URQUHART, supra note 10, at 72.
82
Id. at 73.
83
Id.
76
77

28

One Nation, Under Fraud: A Remonstrance

It is not the position of the authors that the similarities between M’Intosh
and Murch offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Murch was a fraudulent
case. It is, however, the belief of the authors that Murch, like M’Intosh, bears
several of the hallmarks of a manufactured case designed to set the stage for a
contrived precedent. Especially in light of the intimate connections with Webster,
Maine’s land situation, and the timing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, the
authors certainly suggest that, like M’Intosh, Murch is deserving of an analysis so
thorough as Robertson’s.

V.

INTERVENING YEARS: SHIFTING ECONOMICS, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY,

AND THE PAUPER MYTH (1843-1892)

“Poverty is the worst form of violence.”
— Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948 A.D.)
The Murch decision punctuates a period of tribal history in which the
Native American population in Maine was facing two converging threats to their
continued existence: environmental destruction and dispossession. Together, these
interrelated forces had a crippling effect on the tribes’ ability to continue
practicing sustenance hunting and gathering and sustainable living. The tribes
were forced to conform to a euroagrarian construct of farming and
industrialization or else face starvation. It was a false choice: assimilate or die.
A. Dispossession and Economic Assimilation by Force
When Maine became a state in 1820, it was agreed that the millions of
acres of “untamed” wilderness lands that covered the region should become the
“joint property of both” Maine and Massachusetts. By this division, Maine came
into possession of as many as 7,000,000 acres of wild woodlands.84 As the need
for expansion onto public lands was fueled by unchecked lumbering, Maine
desperately wanted to acquire additional lands within its borders. So, in 1853, the
State purchased all remaining land within its borders from the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts for a sum of $362,500.85
Though Maine had a history of having immediately liquidated some public
lands to secure funding for its young government during the earliest stages of
statehood, it began to truly accelerate divestment efforts in the mid-19th century.
Previously, lands had been used as an analogue to a bank loan, with the State
financing political and infrastructural projects with land grants and sales:
84
85
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Indeed, lacking money, the State was led in its early
days to secure the things it desired by the grant and
sale of its lands, the income from which, for many
years, constituted its largest source of revenue. As an
example of this policy, which later generations have
not hesitated to characterize as wasteful, it is
interesting to know that the construction of the State
House was largely paid for with State lands, the
Legislature providing for the sale of twelve
townships, the proceeds of which were to be devoted
to this purpose.86
Such efforts were so lucrative that not only was the State able to fund
governmental infrastructure projects, but funds were also channeled into
promoting the settlement and industrialization of socio-economic centers like
Bangor. Almost overnight, it seemed, lumbering towns exploded in population
size, according to contemporaries such as Henry David Thoreau. Undoubtedly
regarded as a bastion of wealth and industry at this time, Bangor drew frequent
comparisons to “sister cities” like New York and Boston in regard to its
“majesty.”
The State—once heralded as home to “exhaustless” timber resources—had
either sold into private hands or permitted the clearcutting of nearly all of its
public lands. Having unwisely parted with nearly all of this land, Maine was
largely held by private owners in immense tracts, often comprising one or more
townships.87
The effect of dispossession was two-fold. First, dispossession and
industrialization of ancestral lands led to a drastic and accelerated shift in tribal
cultural practices. People who were historically sustainable sustenance hunters
and gatherers were no longer able to live a traditional life. This, in turn forced the
tribes to participate in the colonizer’s foreign economics, in which they were
afforded little opportunity to succeed. Second, having taken nearly every acre of
the tribes’ ancestral lands, and not able to further dispossess them, the State set
about implementing a regime of socio-legal policies aimed at keeping the tribes
financially dependent while at the same time executing an attack on tribal
sovereignty in an attempt to skirt treaty obligations and get the tribes “off the
State’s payroll.”
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B. Environmental Crises and the Hypocrisy of Pauperism
Dispossessed of nearly all of their ancestral land holdings, the tribes began
expanding into white settlements across the state.88 In so doing, the tribes were
less “following” white expansion than they were attempting to maintain ties to
advantageous ecological sites discovered and stewarded by their ancestors for
centuries.89 There was, however, some imperative to intersperse amongst the
white settlements as a means of survival. In the face of unduly restrictive State
hunting, fishing, and trapping laws, the Wabanaki people were unable to practice
traditional means of sustenance.90 By force, the tribal populations became
increasingly dependent on currency and commercial foodstuffs consumed by the
Americans.91 In an effort to earn a living in this alien economy, tribal members
worked as hunting and fishing guides, laborers, lumberjacks and log drivers,
seasonal farmers, basket makers and craftsmen, canoe builders, and even traveling
“Indian doctors” practiced in naturopathy and herbal remedies.92
Further limiting the tribes’ ability to practice their traditional, sustainable
lifestyle was the proliferation of lumber booms during the second quarter of the
19th century, which destroyed ancestral fisheries at Old Town and below the
islands. Species that once swam in abundant numbers such as salmon, shad, and
alewives no longer engaged in migratory spawning in the Penobscot River.93
Concurrently, deforestation and the increasing presence of humans encroaching
ancestral hunting grounds precipitated a decline in moose and deer populations.94
The tribes made some efforts to incorporate agrarian methods into their
traditional means of survival, but met challenges in this, as well. Following John
Attean’s example of planting a corn field at Mattawamkeag Point, many
Penobscots tried their hand at farming on the islands, but spring flooding and
invasive species—like the roaming cattle of the lumber teams—made the riverine
environment hostile to their efforts.95
In the face of the environmental crises befalling them, many indigenous
families were likely “. . . anxious to leave the crowds of laborers and the log jams,
human filth, and thick sawdust polluting their river, not to mention the screaming
saws that destroyed the serenity of their island home.”96 It was around this same
time that many tribal communities began making increased voyages to ancestral
coastal holdings in the Mount Desert Island region which, by this time, was
beginning to take hold as a destination among the Americans. Here, the Indians
See MCBRIDE & PRINS, supra note 16, at 21.
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90
See id.
91
See id., at 21, 30-31.
92
See id.
93
See Pawling, supra note 8, at 33:55.
94
See id.
95
See id.
96
MCBRIDE & PRINS, supra note 16, at 13-14.
88
89

Loring, Mehnert & Gousse

31

coastal holdings in the Mount Desert Island region which, by this time, was
beginning to take hold as a destination among the Americans. Here, the Indians
would sell baskets or medicines.100 Perhaps most importantly, here they would be
free from the constant pressures of the “industrialization surrounding them at
Indian Island and, to a lesser extent, Pleasant Point.”101
Struggling to integrate into the white economy due to the paucity of
opportunities and institutional and societal pressures of racism opposing them, the
tribes fell into deep poverty—inflicted, as it was, by the State’s dispossession of
their lands and interference with their sustenance.
By 1852, the cascade of events that had bankrupted the tribes began to
take on a new narrative. No longer was it the “inferiority” of the “savage” way of
life that white Americans blamed for the impoverished state of the Native
Americans, but instead it was
“native slothfulness” that was
No one seemed to notice that, in fact, it was
to blame.102 According to a
the State leeching from tribal resources,
1852 Governor’s Report on
Indian Affairs, the tribes were
and not the tribes leeching from the State.
destined to remain “in a
condition bordering on
pauperism. . . until their habits have been changed.”103 Though the State (and its
progenitor, Massachusetts)—and not the tribes—had been paupers from their
inception, the proliferation of the “pauper myth” of the Native American had
begun to spread like wildfire. No one seemed to notice that, in fact, it was the
State leeching from tribal resources, and not the tribes leeching from the State.

By 1878, the lumber business—as a whole, regardless of species felled—
began to die down, resulting in yields in 1906 of just 16,000,000 feet per
annum.104 It was this—the death of
Maine’s golden economic years—that
precipitated attempts to extinguish the
[I]t was Maine who had always been
the pauper—dipping into tribal funds
tribes altogether.
Through fabrication of the
and stealing to further engorge itself
pauper narrative, the State attempted
and expand.
to legitimize its efforts to dump the
100
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would sell baskets or medicines.97 Perhaps most importantly, here they would be
free from the constant pressures of the “industrialization surrounding them at
Indian Island and, to a lesser extent, Pleasant Point.”98
Struggling to integrate into the white economy due to the paucity of
opportunities and institutional and societal pressures of racism opposing them, the
tribes fell into deep poverty—inflicted, as it was, by the State’s dispossession of
their lands and interference with their sustenance.
By 1852, the cascade of events that had bankrupted the tribes began to
take on a new narrative. No longer was it the “inferiority” of the “savage” way of
life that white Americans blamed for the impoverished state of the Native
Americans, but instead it was
“native slothfulness” that was
No one seemed to notice that, in fact, it was
to blame.99 According to a
the State leeching from tribal resources,
1852 Governor’s Report on
Indian Affairs, the tribes were
and not the tribes leeching from the State.
destined to remain “in a
condition bordering on
pauperism. . . until their habits have been changed.”100 Though the State (and its
progenitor, Massachusetts)—and not the tribes—had been paupers from their
inception, the proliferation of the “pauper myth” of the Native American had
begun to spread like wildfire. No one seemed to notice that, in fact, it was the
State leeching from tribal resources, and not the tribes leeching from the State.

By 1878, the lumber business—as a whole, regardless of species felled—
began to die down, resulting in yields in 1906 of just 16,000,000 feet per
annum.101 It was this—the death of
Maine’s golden economic years—that
precipitated attempts to extinguish the
[I]t was Maine who had always been
tribes altogether.
the pauper—dipping into tribal funds
Through fabrication of the
and stealing to further engorge itself
pauper narrative, the State attempted
and expand.
to legitimize its efforts to dump the
tribes from its payrolls by dissolving
tribal sovereignty and subsequent assimilation. Maine’s campaign was one of
See id.
Id.
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misinformation and unjust characterization of the tribes as “paupers” when, quite
oppositely, it was Maine who had always been the pauper—dipping into tribal
funds and stealing to further engorge itself and expand.
In an astoundingly hypocritical and shameless perversion of the public
narrative, the duality of tribal versus state self-sufficiency was turned on its head.
In retrospect, this
miscarriage of truth is
brazen in its unabashed
In retrospect, this miscarriage of truth is brazen
falseness. Somehow, the
in its unabashed falseness. Somehow, the State
State succeeded in
succeeded in portraying itself as a beneficent
portraying itself as a
guardian of the “poor, slothful” Indians when, in
beneficent guardian of the
fact, the tribes were and always had been the
“poor, slothful” Indians
economic donor class that carried the endless
when, in fact, the tribes
were and always had been
waves of Euromerican paupers.
the economic donor class
that carried the endless
waves of Euromerican
paupers. Without having stolen tribal lands, Massachusetts and Maine would
never have survived the economic hardships that retarded their growth in infancy.

VI.

GENOCIDE IN THE COURTROOM: STATE V. NEWELL AND THE LAW COURT’S
ASSAULT UPON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY (1892)

“And I can see that something else died there in the bloody mud, and was buried
in the blizzard. A people’s dream died there. It was a beautiful dream.”
— Heȟáka Sápa (or, “Black Elk”) (1823-1950 A.D.)
In this time of economic decline of the lumber industry, the Maine Law
Court found before it a perfect opportunity to end its Treaty obligations to the
Wabanaki Tribes thus eliminating thousands of dollars in annual payments.
Exactly 50 years after the Law Court’s decision in Murch, a seemingly
innocuous hunting trip shared between two Passamaquoddy tribal members would
precipitate the most caustic jurisprudence ever authored by the Maine judiciary.
An attempted death blow to the recognition of tribal sovereignty in Maine, the
Law Court’s 1892 ruling in State v. Newell102 set into motion a cascade of case
law that, over the years, would erode indigenous rights. Belonging to the same
class of infamous decisions as Korematsu (internment of Japanese Americans),
102

State v. Newell, 84 Me. 465, 24 A. 943 (1892).
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Dredd Scott (“people are property”), and Plessy v. Ferguson (“separate but
equal”), Newell is an unapologetic assault upon the sovereignty of the tribes in
Maine and an attempt to illegally cancel the treaty obligations of the State thereto.
Despite Newell’s genocidal and racist intentions, perhaps the most
incredulous legacy it leaves is that it is still lawful precedent. A shameful
miscarriage of justice, Newell is an embarrassment to Maine jurisprudence that
not only mars the legacy of the Law Court so long as it remains “good law,” but
continues to have deleterious effects on tribal sovereignty.
A. Facts and Background
On what was very likely a bitterly cold and snowy morning in the winter
of 1891, Peter Newell and Joseph Gabriel—both members of the Passamaquoddy
Tribe at Peter Dana Point (“Indian Township”)—readied their gear and set out to
go hunting.
They shot two deer that fateful day—January 14, 1891. Unbeknownst to
either of the hunters, the killing of these two deer would soon turn out to be
perhaps the most consequential event in the history of Wabanaki Tribes in Maine.
Whether known to the two hunters or not, Newell’s and Gabriel’s deer
were, in fact, taken during what is referred to as “closed season”—a period of
time in which certain game may not be legally hunted, as regulated by State
fisheries and wildlife laws.
Following the hunt, Newell was issued a summons while on reservation
land. He was indicted and arraigned for “with force and arms kill[ing] and
destroy[ing] two deer, against the peace, & contrary to the statute in such case
made and provided.” At his arraignment, Newell’s attorney entered a guilty plea
and offered the affirmative defense that, by way of Newell’s status as a member
of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, “he had a lawful right” to do so by reason of the
treaties of 1713, 1717, 1725, 1727, 1749, 1752, 1780, and 1794 between the
Passamaquoddy Tribe and the English Crown or the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and the hunting “privileges” reserved to the tribes thereunder. In
other words, Newell acknowledged that he had taken the two animals, but argued
that he had a lawful right to do so by reason of the treaties between his tribe and
Massachusetts.103 At Newell’s arraignment, the parties agreed to petition the Law
Court for review of the matter.
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A bit of historical context on the parties involved in the Newell case bears
discussion. Just eight months after being indicted, Peter Newell was elected Chief
of the Passamaquoddy Tribe at Indian Township on September 30, 1891.
The presiding Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (this
being the official title of Maine’s highest court—known as the “Law Court” when
sitting in its appellate capacity) at this time was John A. Peters. The son of a
lumber merchant from Ellsworth, Maine, Peters was a Yale educated attorney and
member of the secretive Skull and Bones society. Upon his return to Maine,
Peters initially served as a State Senator from 1862-1863 before holding office as
Attorney General from 1863-1866. In 1867, Peters was elected to serve in the
U.S. Congress, where he was a member until 1873, thereafter returning to Maine
to serve as a judge. A decade later, Peters’s jurisprudential career reached its peak
when he was appointed as Chief Justice of the Court—a position he held from
1883 until his resignation in 1900.
Given the focus of this Comment and the depth into which its authors have
examined the political and socio-economic repercussions of Maine’s lumber
industry, it will be of great interest to note that Chief Justice Peters’s second wife,
Fannie E. Roberts, was the daughter of infamous Maine lumber baron Amos
Roberts—he of the Theft of the Four Townships. To state that Chief Justice
Peters’s immediate family had a vested interest in the vitality of the Maine lumber
industry is perhaps an overly modest characterization. That Newell quickly
devolved from a criminal matter bearing upon the killing of two deer in a “closed
season” into a full-on assault of tribal sovereignty by means of treaty rights
recognition is concerning, if not entirely unexpected. As was the case in Murch, it
very much felt as though the “deck was stacked” against the tribes from the very
beginning.
B. Holding and Analysis
Writing on behalf of a unanimous Court (with one justice abstained),
Justice Lucillius Emery (who would later succeed Justice Peters as the Court’s
Chief Justice) spared precious little time departing from the criminal matter at
hand in favor of a more expansive discourse regarding tribal sovereignty.
Although the justiciable controversy before the Court might readily have been
resolved by a facial reading of the hunting statute or the treaties in question, the
Court instead endeavored to cloak itself with the authority to determine, de novo,
what constituted an Indian Tribe.
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matter:

The Court dedicates two sentences to discussing the underlying criminal
The defendant admittedly killed two deer in this State
contrary to the form, letter and spirit of the statute for
the preservation of deer and other game animals. The
only matter of fact he interposes in defense is, that he
is an Indian, one of the Passamaquoddy tribe, a tribe
living on and near Lewey's Island in the eastern part
of the State.104

Having so stated the most basic of facts and Newell’s affirmative defense,
the Court immediately dives headlong into a dialectic analysis of the status of
Native American tribes in general, comparing those in the “east” with the “west”:
Whatever the status of the Indian tribes in the west
may be, all the Indians of whatever tribe, remaining
in Massachusetts and Me. have always been regarded
by those States and by the United States as bound by
the laws of the State in which they live.105
The fallacy of this statement is exposed by an examination of the U.S.
Constitution. The Constitution was drafted in May of 1787 and ratified in July of
1789. At the time of ratification, Art. I, sec. VIII gave the U.S. Congress sole
authority to regulate affairs among the tribes in the United States. Western tribes
were not contemplated by Art. I, sec. VIII because they were not even in the United
States until the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and annexation of Mexican lands in
1848. Contrary to Justice Emery’s assertion, the U.S. Constitution always
considered the eastern tribes as falling under federal—not state—jurisdiction,
because they were the only tribes living within the geographic boundaries of the
United States at the time the Constitution was written.
Citing Murch as direct authority, the Court disingenuously expands the
holding thereof as an access point for reaching a question not before the Court:
‘how then are the Indian tribes regarded in Maine?’ Although the Court then
embarks upon analyses of the treaties, the exercise is entirely illusory given its
ultimate determination:

Newell, 84 Me. at 466, 24 A. at 943.
Id. at 466. This statement, of course, is complete fallacy. There were, in fact, no “western tribes”
under the jurisdiction of the United States of America at the time that the federal government
established its relationships with indigenous populations pursuant to Article I, Section VIII of the
Constitution—establishing sole authority to treat with the tribes—and the Non-Intercourse Act of
1790, vesting in Congress the sole authority to transact with the tribes.
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Whatever may have been the original force and
obligation of these treaties, they are now functus
officio. One party to them, the Indians, have wholly
lost their political organization and their political
existence. There has been no continuity or succession
of political life and power. There is no mention in the
treaties of a tribe called "Passamaquoddy," and we
cannot say that these present Indians are the
successors in territory, or power, of any tribe named
in the treaties, or are their natural descendants.106
It would seem, after all, that the Court found little purpose in its own
academic dissection, given its determination that the treaties did not, in fact, apply
to any Maine tribes still in existence. Justifying this finding, the Court writes:
Though these Indians are still spoken of as the
"Passamaquoddy Tribe," and perhaps consider
themselves a tribe, they have for many years been
without a tribal organization in any political sense.
They cannot make war or peace, cannot make
treaties; cannot make laws; cannot punish crime;
cannot administer even civil justice among
themselves. Their political and civil rights can be
enforced only in the courts of the State; what tribal
organization they may have is for tenure of property
and the holding of privileges under the laws of the
State. They are as completely subject to the State as
any other inhabitants can be. They cannot now
invoke treaties made centuries ago with Indians
whose political organization was in full and
acknowledged vigor.107
The Court delivers its final blow to tribal identity (and thus sovereignty) in
its interpretation of the applicability of the most recent treaty—the Treaty of 1794
and that which, importantly, was the last to reserve the then-present-day holdings
to the Passamaquoddy Tribe:
What the report calls "the treaty of 1794," was simply
a grant by the commonwealth to the Passamaquoddy
tribe of Indians of certain lands and the privilege of
fishing in the Schoodiac river, in consideration of
their releasing all claims to other lands in the
106
107
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commonwealth. Clearly the defendant gains no right
to hunt under that grant.108
In an unabashed miscarriage of judicial restraint and respect for the
separation of powers of government, the 1892 Law Court attempted to deliver a
death blow to the tribes, invalidating nearly two centuries’ worth of treaty
agreements and laying waste to the agency of the tribes to articulate meaningful
defenses to attacks on their sovereignty over the greater part of the next century.
Newell is highly problematic for a multitude of reasons. First, it is a direct
and grave violation of the terms of the Articles of Separation109 in which Maine
expressly recognized and adopted several of the treaties discussed in Newell. As
such, Newell is not only a toxic miscarriage of justice, it is also an illegal decision
properly characterized as a contravention of the highest law of the land.
Also of great concern is the Court’s lack of judicial integrity in following
the spirit and letter of the law. Not only did the Newell Court violate the Maine
Constitution with its decision, but it abandoned established principles regarding
veracious application of stare decisis and faithful adherence to good-faith
principles of logic and reason. Put plainly, it is as if the Newell Court was content
Id.
With Congress’s blessing, the Articles of Separation provided for the establishment of an
independent Maine. Under the Articles, Massachusetts bequeathed unto Maine some 11 million
acres of public lands to which it had previously held title in the District. See URQUHART, supra
note 10, at 42.; see ROLDE, supra note 37, at 227. The reader should understand that beginning
at Maine’s inception in 1820 through 1871, the Articles of Separation and the treaty agreements
thereto were published as a pretext to the Maine State Constitution. Although contemporary
publications of Maine’s Constitution no longer contain the printed text of these treaty agreements,
they remain in full effect per the original Articles. Me. Const. art. X, § 5. The original language of
the Articles relating to the Commonwealth’s treaty obligations to the tribes read: “The new State
shall, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made for that purpose, assume and perform all
the duties and obligations of this Commonwealth, towards the Indians within said District of
Maine, whether the same arise from treaties, or otherwise; and for this purpose shall obtain the
assent of said Indians, and their release to this Commonwealth of claims and stipulations arising
under the treaty at present existing between the said Commonwealth and said Indians; and as an
indemnification to such new State, therefor, this Commonwealth, when such arrangements shall be
completed, and the said duties and obligations assumed, shall pay to said new State, the value of
thirty thousand dollars, in manner following, viz.: The said Commissioners shall set off by metes
and bounds, so much of any part of the land, within the said District, falling to this
Commonwealth, in the division of the public lands, hereinafter provided for, as in their estimation
shall be of the value of thirty thousand dollars; and this Commonwealth shall, thereupon, assign
the same to the said new State, or in lieu thereof, may pay the sum of thirty thousand dollars at its
election; which election of the said Commonwealth, shall be made within one year from the time
that notice of the doings of the Commissioners, on this subject, shall be made known to the
Governor and Council; and if not made within that time, the election shall be with the new State.”
Me. Const. art. X, § 5.
108
109
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with its thinly-veiled attempts to “make it up” as it “went along.” For example,
the interpolation that the tribes had enjoyed “no continuity or succession of
political life and power” is both false and an absurdity. Not only had recognition
of the tribes and tribal membership served as the literal basis for the Court’s logic
in Murch, but even the most cursory review of contemporary legislative reports
would have revealed otherwise. One such report—the 1860 Report from Indian
Agent James A. Purington of Old Town—dated December 15, 1860, documents
that Maine was still paying treaty obligations to the tribes.110
Another article—this from the wife of Passamaquoddy Indian Agent W.
Wallace Brown, recounts that despite the discontinuation of some traditional
cultural and political practices within the Tribe, not all long-practiced rites and
procedures had been replaced:
The government is a tribal assembly, composed of
chief, subordinate chief, (po-too-us-win), captains,
and councilors. The latter are appointed by the chief
from among the old men of the tribe. They do not
make the law for the law is usage transmitted by
tradition. They settle all manner of dispute by the
decision of the majority, receiving the chief’s
sanction.111
Although the learned Court might not have had the benefit of electronic
databases or the internet at the time it decided Newell, it certainly had access to
contemporary publications and, more importantly, legislative materials. Given
that the sole objective of the Law Court is to apply the Maine Constitution and the
laws of the State in resolving appellate cases, one would hazard to guess that said
justices had a fast and loose relationship with legal research. A more discerning
perspective, however—and that held by the authors—is that this judicial
“activism” was purposeful.
The finality of the Law Court’s decree being what it was at the time,
Newell entered the world as a piece of shameful revisionist judicial activism
aimed at eradicating the very existence of the ancient Wabanaki civilization.
Importantly, it is a decision which amounts to a one-sided argument by a
governmental body purposed to be an impartial arbiter of objective justice. It is,
though, the toxic legacy of Newell that is perhaps its most poisonous attribute.
Stacked atop the fraudulent Murch decision, Newell is the crown jewel of the
house of cards that is Maine Indian Law. Newell stands on nothing, yet stands for
See Purinton, James A., "1860-12-15 Annual report of James A. Purinton, Agent for the
Penobscot Tribe" (1860). Documents. 96. https://digitalmaine.com/native_tribal_docs/96.
111
Brown, Mrs. W Wallace, Chief-making among the Passamaquoddy Indians, 37, No. 3 Maine
History 132 (1998).
110
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everything when it comes to the subsequent lineage of cases that have vitiated
tribal sovereignty throughout the ensuing decades. In the words of
Passamaquoddy Tribal Historian and former Tribal Representative to the Maine
Legislature Donald Soctomah, the precedent set by Newell would set off a
cascade effect that propelled the tribes into what he called “the Invisible Years”
between 1890-1920.112
The deplorable
living conditions suffered
The finality of the Law Court’s decree being
by the residents of the
Penobscot and
what it was at the time, Newell entered the
Passamaquoddy
world as a piece of shameful revisionist
Reservations in the midjudicial activism aimed at censoring the very
20th Century provide a
existence of the ancient Wabanaki civilization.
stark case study
illustrative of Soctomah’s
“Invisible Years.” In
1934, Dr. Gladys Tantaquidgeon—then a young Mohegan woman working at the
Bureau of Indian Affairs—visited the reservations in Maine, recording her
observations of the unsanitary and inhumane conditions.113 Sent by Commissioner
John Collier to report on the general state of the Penobscots and Passamaquoddy,
Tantaquidgeon visited Indian Island and found the residents to be in a state of
utter despair.114 Tantaquidgeon was horrified to discover that the State had
condemned the Tribe’s wells and subsequently was derelict in any attempt to
restore or provide a source of potable drinking water. Tantaquidgeon learned that
the Tribe had only managed to survive by retrieving ice during the winter months,
storing it, and melting it down. Compounding the health threats posed by a lack of
clean drinking water was the fact that the Tribe was without a working sewage
system.
Traveling east, Tantaquidgeon found conditions equally deplorable at the
Passamaquoddy reservations.
Living amongst ramshackle
Stacked atop the fraudulent Murch
shelters and failing structures
decision, Newell is the crown jewel of the
was a malnourished and
house of cards that is Maine Indian law.
diseased population plagued by
Newell stands on nothing, yet stands for
childhood malnutrition,
everything when it comes to the subsequent
tuberculosis, and venereal
disease. Tantaquidgeon learned
lineage of cases that have vitiated tribal
that as much as 95% of the
sovereignty throughout the ensuing
Passamaquoddy relied on
decades.
“relief notes” to survive, and it
See SOCTOMAH, supra note 34.
ROLDE, supra note 38, at 269.
114
See id. at 270.
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was a near universal practice for families to sleep on floors covered with
threadbare coats, for want of proper beds.115
The “Invisible Years” were long and difficult. It would be another eight
years after Tantaquidgeon’s visit to Maine before the State’s greed and desire to
stop paying meager aid to the tribes would set into motion publication of the
Proctor Report, thus bringing the tribes back into the spotlight.
C. Considerations
That Newell remains “valid” precedent is an embarrassment to Maine
jurisprudence. That it has not yet gone the route of similarly abhorrent decisions
like Korematsu, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Dredd Scott is an embarrassment for the
Court. But, this does not have to be the case. In fact, there are plenty of
considerations which, if applied by an informed Court seeking to restitute the
grave harms effected by Newell, could provide fertile grounds for a reversal of
course.
For example, the Law Court lacked jurisdictional authority to issue rulings
interpreting treaties with Native American nations.116 It had no authority to
determine what constituted and how to legally define a tribe (typically the
province of the federal government). Neither did it have authority to determine
tribal membership. Nor was it imbued with the power to assess whether a tribe
may invoke treaty obligations. In truth, the Law Court had no more authority to
interpret or enforce tribal treaties than it would the Paris Accord.
It would be an understatement to suggest that the Law Court, sitting in
1892, was merely ‘ill-equipped’ to decide these questions even if it somehow
could manufacture judicial authority. It outright lacked the authority to do so. For
example, in interpreting the 1794 Treaty, the Newell Court concluded that the
Passamaquoddy Tribe—setting aside for a moment its belief that the tribe “didn’t
exist”—could not hunt on its own land because hunting was not expressly
mentioned in the land grants thereunder. This begs the question: what is a land
treaty if not the grant of land for something in return?
In addition to questions of jurisdiction, authority, and competence, there
are of course also considerations borne out by contemporary historico-legal
115

See id. at 271.

Premised upon the constitutional authority vested in Congress pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution (Art. VI) and federal jurisdiction over treaties (Art. III, Sec. II), the
Supreme Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia is illustrative of this point: “The Constitution,
by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land,
has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits
their rank among the powers who are capable of making treaties. . . . The Cherokee nation, then, is
a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force . . . The whole intercourse between the United States and
this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the Government of the United States.”
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519 (emphasis added).

116

Loring, Mehnert & Gousse

41

analysis. As anthropologist Darren Ranco, Ph.D., has opined, the Maine
Constitution contemplates a dichotomy of tribal-state relations that is far afield of
that put into practice. Referencing the “Indians not taxed” language included in
the Constitution of the State of Maine, Dr. Ranco theorizes that it “recognizes . . .
they are not a part of the public and the republic of the U.S. and State of Maine in
that context. . . .”117 The importance of harnessing the insight afforded by
contemporary social, economic, and political study cannot be understated and, by
example of Dr. Ranco’s analysis, may even be revelatory in presenting modern
courts with the necessary perspective to revisit foundational legal documents and
principles that have been misconstrued for centuries.
Of course, context always matters and only through thoughtful application
of these analyses can our society function in a just and equitable manner. For, as
Dr. Ranco acknowledges, even though the “Indians not taxed” language is
properly interpreted as a recognition of tribal sovereignty, it is in many ways a
“double-edged sword.”118 According to Dr. Ranco, while “a great recognition [of
sovereignty] … [i]t allows for a category of ‘racialized otherness’ for the State to
really treat Indians as second-class citizens, as a racialized group not deserving of
a full set of rights and also therefore ignoring any kind of promises that are
embedded, for example, in the Articles of Separation and treaties.”119

Darren Ranco, Ph.D., Wabanaki Windows, Unpacking Sovereignty (6th in a series), at 02:45
(July 21, 2021), https://archives.weru.org/wabanaki-windows/2021/07/wabanaki-windows-7-2721-unpacking-sovereignty-6th-in-a-series/.
118
Id. at 05:11.
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PART IV: THE INDIAN PAPERS: MAINE’S OWN ‘NIXON TAPES’
VII.

A LEGISLATIVE DISCOURSE OF ‘SQUAWS,’ ‘FREAKS OF NATURE,’ AND ‘PAUPERS’
“But when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal.”
— Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994 A.D.)
A. LD 694: An Act Relating to Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by
Marriage
On the afternoon of July 28, 1942, members of the Joint Legislative
Research Committee gathered at the State House in Augusta, Maine. On the
docket for consideration that day was L.D. 694—“An Act Relating to Loss of
Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage.”120 Sponsored by Senator George W.
Chamberlain and touted as “an attempt backed up by the Indians in general to try
and limit membership in the tribes,” L.D. 694 stripped tribal membership from
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy women who married non-tribal partners:
If any woman who is a member of the tribe marries a
man who is neither a member of the tribe nor eligible
for membership therein she shall forfeit her
membership in the tribe and shall not be eligible for
adoption into the tribe during the period of such
marriage. All provisions of this section shall apply to
the Passamaquoddy tribe of Indians as well as to the
Penobscot tribe, and such persons shall be subject to
removal from the tribal reservations as provided in
sections 261 and 291 of this chapter.121
It is incomprehensible that the Maine Legislature thought itself
empowered to determine who is and who is not a tribal member. Even the federal
government, which has a constitutional mandate to regulate relations with the
tribes, has never claimed the authority to determine tribal membership. Indeed, as

An Act Relating to Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage: Hearing on L.D. 694
before the Legislative Research Committee, 90th Legis. (July 28, 1942) (testimony of Norman W.
MacDonald, Director of Social Welfare) (hereinafter “MacDonald Testimony”).
121
L.D. 694 (90th Legis. 1942).
120
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the Indian Child Welfare Act would subsequently acknowledge, the ability to
determine tribal membership is the ability to eradicate the tribe.122
Earlier that year, when L.D. 694 was initially presented to the 90th
Legislature, lawmakers were flummoxed to discover that tribal laws already
provided a system limiting title transfers of reservation land between tribal
members. Although these tribal laws were distinct from L.D. 694’s express
purpose of vitiating membership on the basis of marriage, the revelation
apparently generated confusion amongst legislators about the nature of the State’s
relationship with the tribes, the laws applicable thereto, and the history behind
Tribal-State relations.
The Legislature referred the matter to the Research Committee for
clarification. In response, the Research Committee appointed Maine Attorney
Donald W. Webber as Special Counsel. Special Counsel Webber—who eleven
years later, in 1953, would take a seat as a justice on the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court—had previously served the Legislature as a legal advisor to the Joint
Special Session Investigative
Committee. Upon assessing the bill
Special Counsel Webber proposed
in question and the uncertainty of
that the Research Committee
legislators as to Maine’s entire
convene to discuss both the bill
“Indian situation,” Special Counsel
and Maine’s “Indian Situation.”
Webber concluded that it be a waste
of legislative resources to “spend
too much time just on [L.D. 694]
unless we might be considering at the same time some of the broader aspects of
the whole Indian situation in Maine . . . .”123
Special Counsel Webber proposed that the Research Committee convene
to discuss both the bill and Maine’s “Indian situation.” A panel was
commissioned and scheduled to meet on July 28, 1942, at which time it would

This maxim finds its genesis in the testimony of Chief Calvin Isaac, Mississippi Band of
Choctaw. In Chief Isaac’s testimony before the United States Senate’s Select Committee on Indian
Affairs, considering the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977, he said “. . . [C]ulturally, the chances
of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children, the only real means for the
transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the
ways of their people. . . . Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut the tribes' ability to
continue as self-governing communities. Probably in no area is it more important that tribal
sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially and culturally determinative as family
relationships.” The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 before the U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Congress, First Session. (August 4, 1977).
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An Act Relating to Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage: Hearing on L.D. 694
before the Legislative Research Committee, 90th Legis. (July 28, 1942) (testimony of Donald W.
Webber, Special Counsel to the Legislative Research Committee)(hereinafter “Webber
Testimony”).
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call upon officials from the Attorney General’s office and the Department of
Health and Welfare.
B. MacDonald and Cowen Testimony before the Legislative Research
Committee (1942)
Special Counsel Webber convened the Legislative Research Committee
panel on July 28, 1942, at two o’clock in the afternoon. After welcoming those in
attendance—an audience of which consisted of members of both the State House
and Senate— Special Counsel Webber again explained the nature of business to
be discussed. He disclosed that he had ordered a contemporaneous record of the
proceedings “. . . simply because in considering so many different problems none
of us can retain this stuff in our minds . . . .”124 Despite this, however, Special
Counsel Webber reminded lawmakers and officials that he had no intention “to
confine [them] to the record at all,” and offered free reign to discuss matters off
the record as requested.125
First to testify was Norman W. MacDonald, Director of Social Welfare for
the State of Maine.126 Special Counsel Webber invited Mr. MacDonald to educate
the Committee as to the background of L.D. 694, and to offer the Department of
Health and Welfare’s official position on its soundness. MacDonald began his
testimony by explaining that L.D. 694 arose out of an attempt to limit tribal
membership, which he claimed was “backed up by the Indians in general . . . .”127
MacDonald recounted the Legislature’s inability to reconcile the proposed law
with existing tribal and state regulations on title transfers of reservation lands. He
added that there was resistance from “certain members” of the tribal communities
who “d[id] not want to be deprived of their property right through marriage. . .”128
Ultimately, MacDonald expressed his belief that the bill’s marriage mandate
would “. . . limit membership in the tribe to persons who are actual Indians . . .” as
opposed to “our present laws which could result in the end in having no fullblooded Indians or even half-blooded Indians even.”129

Id. In hindsight, this administrative directive by Special Counsel Webber had the effect of
essentially creating a time capsule, for which the authors are supremely grateful. Without Special
Counsel Webber’s record of the proceedings of the Legislative Research Committee on L.D. 694,
much of the critically important context of the Proctor Report and its place in Maine history
would be lost.
125
Id.
126
In 1933, the Maine Department of Health and Welfare was given general supervisory authority
of the tribes. P.L. 1933, ch. 1, §241.
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MacDonald Testimony, supra note 123.
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State Representative and Republican Floor Leader Walter Mayo Payson of
Portland interjected, focusing on what he referred to as the “fundamental
proposition” of “. . . what [was] the situation with relation to these tribes? Are
they practically
people on the State
payroll, stateMacDonald’s response was to point to the original
supported and stateobligations of the State of Massachusetts which were
sponsored?”130
absorbed and assented to by the State of Maine in the
MacDonald’s
Articles of Separation concurrent with its admission
response
was to point
to statehood in 1820.
to the original treaty
obligations of the
State of Massachusetts which were absorbed and assented to by the State of
Maine in the Articles of Separation concurrent with its admission to statehood in
1820.
Payson rebuffed MacDonald; he explained that he was not interested in
what the treaties provided for but what the practical effect was. In his words, what
was the “actual situation” with regard to State expenditures for supporting the
tribes?
MacDonald’s answer—that Maine was spending approximately $48,000
per annum to “support” the Penobscot Tribe—prompted a deluge of questions
about whether and how tribal members worked to support themselves.131 The
discussion then moved to whether the treaties had memorialized land transfer
agreements between the tribes and Maine or Massachusetts. Committee Chair and
State Senator Robert B. Dow addressed the question directly, asking of the tribes’
assent to treaty terms: “Do they agree to give us the rest of Maine if we will give
them some reservations?”132
The Research Committee had now strayed from discussion of the bill, and
MacDonald began explaining Maine’s history of land transactions with the tribes,
including the “purchase” of the four townships from the Penobscot Tribe in the
1833.

An Act Relating to Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage: Hearing on L.D. 694
before the Legislative Research Committee, 90th Legis. (July 28, 1942) (testimony of W. Mayo
Payson, State Representative) (hereinafter “Payson Testimony”).
131
MacDonald Testimony, supra note 123.
132
An Act Relating to Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage: Hearing on L.D. 694
before the Legislative Research Committee, 90th Legis. (July 28, 1942) (testimony of Robert B.
Dow, Committee Chair and State Senator) (hereinafter “Dow Testimony”). This a tacit admission
that the State occupied land still belonging to the tribes, which would come to bear in the Maine
Indian Land Claims litigation.
130

46

One Nation, Under Fraud: A Remonstrance

Special Counsel Webber refocused the Committee, asking MacDonald
whether the Department favored L.D. 694.133 To this, MacDonald responded by
noting his concerns that the bill might unfairly deprive tribal members of their
lawful property without consideration.134 When asked, however, if the
Department favored the bill “insofar as [it] prevent[ed] the addition of further
white blood into the picture . . .” MacDonald replied “yes.”135
Having come to a consensus on the propriety of the underlying aims of
L.D. 694, the Committee began discussing how to amend the bill so as to
ameliorate any “unjust” deprivation of tribal property rights. To this end,
MacDonald suggested a provisional period—perhaps ten years—in which tribal
members could liquidate their holdings or, alternatively, a system to allow the
State to purchase and hold title to the land.136
After much debate about what a state acquisition program might look like,
Representative Payson again interjected; how did any of this get the tribes off of
state support programs?137 It didn’t, confessed MacDonald; who agreed that the
bill was “not a means of solving the problem of supporting the Indians.”138
From there, the “discussion” devolved into a cacophony of uninformed
conjecture and confusion. The real impetus for L.D. 694 was laid bare:
There was considerable concern that “[s]ome degraded white men . . .
would marry Indian women and live on the reservation”139 at the expense of and
“[o]n the bounty of the State.”140
Chairman Dow inquired which was more prevalent: “. . . white men
marrying squaws, or vice versa.”141
Indian Agent Flagg Cummings’s contribution was an anecdote of a “quite
ugly” and “bossy” white man who had “married an Indian girl,” had eleven
children, and “liv[ed] on the reservation [while] the State support[ed] his
family.”142
With this, MacDonald concurred that “[o]f course, they are not very high
class white men that marry in there.” Though, ultimately, it was the uncontrolled
Webber Testimony, supra note 126.
MacDonald Testimony, supra note 123.
135
Id.
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Id.
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Payson Testimony, supra note 133.
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An Act Relating to Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage: Hearing on L.D. 694
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expansion of “pauper support,”143,144 that MacDonald stated “. . . [was] a real
problem.”145
What followed in the Committee’s discourse was a disturbing dialogue in
which the members laid bare their aspirations to dissolve the tribes in Maine.
At one point, Representative Payson inquired about “. . . segregating these
people and keeping them intact as a separate people”146 to which MacDonald
replied such a plan was not feasible because “. . . those people are citizens of the
United States.”147
Instead, MacDonald opined that a law “to prohibit white men living on the
reservation” might work, offering “. . . if they married a squaw they have got to
leave there.”148 This was met with approval from State Senator Jean Charles
Boucher, who declared “[i]f a white man has a squaw, get them off the reservation
and keep them off the rest of their life, and their children can’t go back.”149 The
discussion showed an astounding ignorance of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as
Chief Justice Marshall had held in Worcester v. Georgia150 that states have no
right to dictate who may go onto tribal lands. That authority rests with the
sovereign tribe.
After a brief yet disturbing tangent endorsing Native American children
crossing frozen areas of Penobscot River during spring and fall thaw to attend
school,151 it was agreed that the
State should endeavor to dissolve
[I]t was agreed that the State should
the tribes. MacDonald opined that
endeavor to dissolve the tribes.
the State might absorb the
reservations into adjacent
townships152 to which one legislator
replied such a plan would serve the goals of assimilating the tribes.153
The Committee wanted a way to move forward, both on L.D. 694 and on
the larger “Indian situation.” It was Representative Payson who compared the
Dow Testimony, supra note 123.
Payson Testimony, supra note 133.
145
MacDonald Testimony, supra note 123.
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Charles Boucher, State Senator).
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situation to a “miniature slave problem,” offering that any attempts to dissolve the
tribes and integrate the members into society would be reminiscent of the
Reconstruction Era South:
You gave the slaves in the south emancipation, made
them all free men, but you didn’t solve anything so
far as the economic problem was concerned. We
have got a minature [sic] slave problem here, and it
seems to me we need to be careful in working it out,
not by the Legislature but by people who know how
to work people out of a bad proposition as a social
proposition.154
Properly concluding that the Committee was woefully uninformed and therefore
ill-equipped to make any substantive policy recommendations, MacDonald
suggested that the Committee commission an investigation “. . . to make a real
study of the Indian
situation from 1820 on . .
.”155 “Wouldn’t you like to
[T]he Committee apparently not only sought
know,” MacDonald asked
an investigation into the ‘Indian Situation’
the Committee, “why we
for the purposes of moving forward with its
made the treaty with the
plans to disband State financial support for
Indians in the first place,
the tribes, but also to “get enough facts from
and . . . why we have
any source to destroy the myth that the
utterly ignored and set up a
Indians own the State and we are paying
new group of laws to
them interest on that ownership . . . .”
govern Indian affairs, and
since we did, what has been
the effect?”156
The Committee did. As evidenced by Representative Payson’s testimony, the
Committee
apparently not
“If we can get rid of that whole phase by reporting this whole
only sought an
thing as a deal between the Indians and the State of Maine
investigation
and they have been doing pretty well . . . we might be able to
into the ‘Indian
lay a little background for a long-range plan that wouldn’t
situation’ for
have so much maudlin sympathy.”
the purposes of
—W. Mayo Payson, State Representative
moving
Payson Testimony, supra note 133.
MacDonald Testimony, supra note 123.
156
Id.
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forward with its plans to disband State financial support for the tribes, but also to
“get enough facts from any source to destroy the myth the Indians own the State
and we are paying them interest on that ownership. . .”157 The plan was clear:
“. . . if we can get rid of that whole phase by reporting this whole thing as a deal
between the Indians and the State of Maine and they have been doing pretty well
. . . we might be able to lay a little background for a long-range plan that wouldn’t
have so much maudlin sympathy.”158
With the die cast on the plan to commission an investigative report of
Tribal-State relations, the Committee broke for a recess. Later that same day,
Maine Attorney General Frank I. Cowen was called to testify before the
Legislative Research Committee to “share any pearls of wisdom” about the
legality of L.D. 694. Addressing the panel before him, Attorney General Cowen
advised that he could “not remember the exact bill” but was intimately familiar
with “. . . quite a few individuals come into the tribe who have been adopted
under that quarter blood law that have been trouble makers. . .”159
When asked about his opinion as to long-term solutions to Maine’s
“Indian situation,” Cowen expressed the opinion that the tribal members were
“just children” and would “never develop” unless Maine undertook coordinated
efforts to “[get] any of them that show any ambition at all off the island and away
from the reservation.”160
Special Counsel Webber then immediately jumped to the Committee’s
concerns about Maine’s
historical intercourse with the
Cowen expressed the opinion that the tribal
tribes, asking: “Do you think
members were “just children” and would
we owe them any money?”161
“never develop” unless Maine undertook
Cowen was unequivocal.
coordinated efforts to “[get] any of them
“Oh yes,” he replied. “No
that show any ambition at all off the island
doubt about that. . . I think we
and away from the reservation.”
owe them some millions
probably.”162

Payson Testimony, supra note 133.
Id.
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before the Legislative Research Committee, 90th Legis. (July 28, 1942) (testimony of Frank I.
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Having perhaps unwittingly opened Pandora’s Box, Cowen continued on,
seemingly unaware of the
tensions discussed by the
Committee during the
“Do you think we owe [the Indians] any
earlier session that day.
money,” asked Special Counsel Webber.
Although Cowen
acknowledged that he felt
Cowen was unequivocal. “Oh yes,” he replied.
Maine had “paid [the tribes]
“No doubt about that . . . I think we owe them
very well” in recent history,
some millions probably.”
he added: “You go back
into earlier history of the
State and it would seem fairly apparent that [the tribes] were robbed left and
right.”163
Chairman Dow punctuated Cowen’s testimony, asking the Attorney
General if he supported a program that would “wipe them out.”164 When Cowen
said that he did not, Dow asked “what is an Indian anyhow?”165
Cowen’s response
amounted to the belief that
Chairman Dow punctuated Cowen’s testimony,
interracial relationships
asking the Attorney General if he supported a
between tribal members
program that would “wipe them out.”
and non-members quickly
dissolved “Indian
characteristics.”166 He then proffered an example of two brothers with Native
American descent, one of whom had “quite a lot of Indian blood in him” while his
brother did “not seem to show any Indian characteristics.”167 To this, Special
Counsel Webber proclaimed “[t]hat is a freak of nature.”168

Id.
Dow Testimony, supra note 135.
165
Id. It is significant and worth mentioning that although Attorney General Cowen and the
Research Committee displayed a very clear disdain for Native Americans—referring to them as
slow, imbecilic, and wards rather than citizens—the Legislature, just one year earlier, had
petitioned the Law Court for a determination of Native American voting rights. Here, in the span
of just two years, Maine’s vacillating stance on indigenous citizenship is laid bare for what it was,
and always has been: fluid and subservient to whatever political whims are prevailing at the time.
When it benefitted the State to argue that there could be “no nation within a nation,” they argued
that the tribes were comprised of citizens. Elsewhere, when it fit the narrative of disparaging the
tribal members as imbeciles and paupers, citizens they were considered no longer.
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Having sufficiently demonstrated a shared perspective of the societal caste
of these “freaks of
nature,” the
Committee pressed
“Well, I had a feeling it would be more than we
Cowen on whether he
wanted to see in that closet, so I closed the door.”
had ever investigated
— Frank I. Cowen, Maine Attorney General
“the whole Indian
thing” in his official
capacity and made a report.169
Cowen’s response was striking: “On the Indians, no, sir. I was scared of it
when I got into it and closed the door.” He further explained his previous efforts
to investigate the “Indian situation” in Maine—an exercise which led him into the
archives of the State House and Land Office:
I was digging into things down there and I kept
running into this stuff, and I was checking up on the
Indian Trust Fund, trying to find the origin of it and
find out why it was a certain amount of course, and
as I went back through the Land Office records I
began to get more and more dubious. I finally said
‘the Indian Trust Fund amounts to $138,000—
period,’ and stopped right there.170
To this, Representative Payson offered perhaps the most developed
thought shared between Committee members that June afternoon: “This is a
skeleton in our closet.”171
“Well,” Cowan responded. “I had a feeling it would be more than we
wanted to see in that closet, so I closed the door.”172
C. ‘A State of Utter Confusion’: Commissioning the Proctor Report to
address Maine’s ‘Indian Problem’
Having arrived at a “state of utter confusion” at the conclusion of
testimony,173 the Committee members agreed to commission an investigation of
Maine State-Tribal affairs and history. At the end of August that same year,
Special Counsel Webber obtained funds from the Committee for the purposes of
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commissioning Ralph W. Proctor—a local school administrator174—to investigate
the matter and draft a report.
Proctor’s work—which took approximately five weeks to finish175—was
not foundational. When the Maine Legislature transferred “general supervision”
of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Tribes to the Maine Department of Health
and Welfare in March 1933, the Department commissioned a research study of
Tribal-State relations referred to simply as the “Indian Project.”176 Margaret Snow
of Rockland, Maine, was hired to lead the research project.177 In a letter from Ms.
Snow to the Department of Health and Welfare, she summarized what she
understood to be the aim of the project:
During the 114 years of her jurisdiction over these
two tribes, the State has built up in the performance
of her obligations acquired in the separation of Maine
from Massachusetts in 1820, certain policies,
practices, and customs. Yet, the evidence of these
policies, of these practices, and of these customs
through the years, lie buried in a mass of legislative,
executive, and judicial state documentary records,
both published, and in manuscript form. To unearth,
to compile, and finally, to reduce this knowledge to
a concise, workable medium for both historical fact,
present development, and future possibility with
regard to Indian Affairs, is the aim, or hope of the
present project.178
Following her commission, Ms. Snow and her cousin, Dorothy Snow,
conducted extensive research in the archives of the Governor’s Council “with
great thoroughness and investigated various departments in the State House for

Hearing on Ralph W. Proctor’s ‘Report on Maine Indians,’ 90th Legis. (October 6, 1942)
(testimony of Donald W. Webber, Special Counsel to the Legislative Research Committee)
(hereinafter “Dow Testimony”). At the time he conducted his investigation and drafted the
Proctor Report, Proctor was acting principal of Edward Little High School—a public school
located and still operating today in Auburn, Maine.
175
Final Report of the Legislative Research Committee for 1941-1942 to the 91st Legislature 4
(Dec. 1, 1942) (hereinafter “Final Report of the Legislative Research Committee”).
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Report of Margaret Snow to the Director for Women’s Relief under the Federal Civil Works
Program 1 (Feb. 20, 1934) (available at:
https://digitalmaine.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=arc_finding_aids).
177
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original source material on the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Indians.”179
Unfortunately, it appears as though the Department of Health and Welfare
deemed the Snows research of little importance and destroyed some of it:
It is evident on examination of this manuscript that a
great deal of the material used and compiled by Miss
Snow in the early stages of the work was discarded.
The intent of the project was to discover exactly what
the state’s policy in Indian affairs had been when by
Act of the Legislature, March 28, 1933, the conduct
of Indian affairs was turned over to the Bureau of
Health and Welfare. Much of the information
gathered by Miss Margaret Snow could not be of
very great value to the Bureau who employed her. It
was, however, of great value to the Indian historian
and should have been preserved.180
Several years later, on January 5, 1942—approximately eight months
before the commissioning of the Proctor Report—Margaret and Dorothy Snow
were killed when they were struck while changing a tire on a roadway in
Rockland, Maine.181 Reflecting on this sudden and unexpected tragedy, Maine
historian Elizabeth Ring—who later came into possession of the surviving Snow
research materials—lamented that “[t]he accidental death in 1942 of the two
young women who worked on the project leaves doubt as to what actually became
the typed material from which the followed report was made.”182
After Snow’s death, Ms. Ring shepherded the surviving research materials
from the Department of Health and Welfare archives to the Maine State Library in
June 1942. Given the speed with which Mr. Proctor subsequently conducted his
five-week investigation, one wonders whether and just how much of the Snows’
original research was available to him.
Ultimately, Proctor finished his “Report on Maine Indians”—which came
to be known as the Proctor Report—in September 1942. Broken into ten sections,
the Proctor Report contained investigative analyses of subject matter ranging

Untitled Cover Letter of Historian Elizabeth Ring Regarding “Indian Material” in the
Possession of the Bureau of Health and Welfare Turned Over to the Maine State Library (June 25,
1942) (available at:
https://digitalmaine.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=arc_finding_aids)(hereinafter
“Ring Letter”).
180
Id.
181
Shocking Double Tragedy, COURIER-GAZETTE (Rockland, ME), Jan. 6, 1942, at 1, 3.
182
Ring Letter, supra note 182.
179

54

One Nation, Under Fraud: A Remonstrance

from “Treaty Rights and Obligations” to histories of tribal funds and
appropriations, tribal censuses, and a report on the “Progress of Indians.”183
Touted by Special Counsel Webber as the new “leading authority on
Indian affairs in the State of Maine,” Principal Proctor delivered testimony to the
Legislative Research Committee on October 6, 1942.184 Proctor advised the
Committee that his research had been guided by six questions:
 What is an Indian;
 Do we owe the Indians any money;
 How many Indians are there;
 What is the condition of the Indians;
 What should we do for them; and
 What are their citizenship rights? 185
The discussion that followed on October 6, 1942, and the conclusions
drawn by the Proctor Report are the subject of Section VII of this Remonstrance.
The principal conclusions, however, can be summarized here: Proctor offered
unconditional support for “the policy of limiting responsibility toward the Indian
tribes.”186
When Chairman Dow responded with the suggestion that “[y]ou could
have the State buy [reservation land under tribal title] and tear down the buildings
and keep somebody else from living there”187 Ralph Proctor—“Maine’s leading
authority on
Indian
affairs”
Two months later, in its Final Report to the 91st Legislature,
replied:
the Legislative Research Committee would acknowledge more
“[y]ou might
than a century of militant State programs, tactics, and
gradually
behaviors that worked to injure the tribes. As reparations for
buy back the
these enumerated harms, the Committee would suggest de
reservation,”
minimus legal relief—without interest.
before the
Committee
stopped transcription and went off the record.188
See generally the Proctor Report, supra note 39, at 18.
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Two months later, in its Final Report to the 91st Legislature, the
Legislative Research Committee would acknowledge more than a century of
militant State programs, tactics, and behaviors that worked to injure the tribes. As
reparations for these enumerated harms, the Committee would suggest de
minimus legal relief—without interest.
VIII.

THE 1942 PROCTOR REPORT
“You will forgive me if I tell you that my people were Americans for thousands of
years before your people were here. The question is not how you can Americanize
us, but how we can Americanize you. We have been working at that for a long
time.”
—Unknown Indigenous Voice (as appearing in Felix
S. Cohen’s Americanizing the White Man, 1952)
Exactly 50 years after the Law Court’s severe hobbling of tribal
sovereignty in Newell (but still 38 years before the Maine Indian Land Claims
Settlement would ‘finish the job’ of stamping out tribal independence almost
entirely), the Research Committee for the 90th Maine Legislature found itself in a
bit of a sticky wicket. Having endeavored to legislate on matters affecting a
culture and a people of which and whom they had precious little (if any shred of)
intelligible understanding, lawmakers exposed themselves as ignorant of the
history, relationship, and ongoing obligations and duties existing between the
tribes and the State.
When Ralph Proctor delivered his
Proctor Report in September 1942 after
Proctor’s findings allowed him to
just five weeks of research, the Research
support “the policy of limiting
Committee convened to hear his
responsibility toward the Indian
testimony in October. During his
tribes.”
testimony, Proctor fielded questions
about his findings and explained the
structure of his inquiry. Proctor defined
his mandate as “. . . to record general trends and practices through a careful study
of basic treaties, legislation, handling of funds, and present responsibilities, in
order to furnish a basis for consideration of future policy in regard to Indian
affairs.”189
Having established his objectives, he set out to answer the six primary
questions previously identified to help “educate” the Research Committee.190
189
190
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Then, in a shocking moment of candor characteristic of the hostile social
mores of 1940’s America, Proctor put into words the objective of the 90th
Legislature: his findings allowed him to support “the policy of limiting
responsibility toward the Indian tribes.”191
Through the Proctor Report, we regain a window fixed upon a moment in
time; an almost fleeting moment when the State—evoking the taped confessions
of disgraced future president
Richard Nixon—let down its
guard and admitted to
Now, unveiled and dragged into the light,
genocidal acts and intentions.
the Proctor Report serves as a self-audit
Laying naked for all the world
and accounting of the conscious purpose of
to bear its goals of
Maine’s persecution of the tribes.
“assimilation,” “buy[ing] back
the reservation,” “limiting
responsibility towards the Indian[s],” and even undertaking measures such as
controlling the intermarriage and interbreeding of mixed-race couples, the State
apparently forgot that “the tape was running.” Now, unveiled and dragged into the
light, the Proctor Report serves as a self-audit and accounting of the conscious
purpose of Maine’s persecution of the tribes.
A. This Land is Your Land, and Now It’s My Land: Treaty Abruptions and
Fraudulent Transfers of Tribal Land Holdings
As revelatory as the conclusions of the Proctor Report and the subsequent
recommendations of the Legislative Research Committee are, the research that
forms the substance of the Proctor Report is rather paltry. In evaluating some
three centuries of historical events and documents, Proctor revealed three
instances of land “transactions” that constituted potential violations of Maine’s
treaty obligations to the tribes. As has been made abundantly clear by this
Remonstrance, there have been far more than three instances of uncompensated
and/or fraudulent dispossession of the Maine tribes.
Later characterized by the Committee as “certain minor items in
connection with the handling of Indian affairs . . .”192 Proctor described the
following three transactions:
1.) On October 11, 1835, the State sold, at auction, three islands in the
Penobscot River belonging to the Penobscot Nation for $7,550
($237,300.79 in 2021 USD). The tribe never received this money.;193
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2.) The sale of 15 islands in the St. Croix River—having been granted to the
Passamaquoddy Tribe in the 1794 Treaty, despite having been sold to a
William Bingham in 1793—were assessed by an Indian Agent in 1855 as
having been worth $2,000 ($50,288.91 in 2021 USD). The Tribe never
obtained the islands or the $2,000 value; 194 and
3.) In October 1834, the State sold to Joseph Granger, at auction for $7,530
($242,176.18 in 2021 USD), a collection of said islands in Old Town Falls
belonging to the Passamaquoddy Tribe under the 1794 Treaty obligations.
In 1855, Granger sued the Tribe for trespass thereupon and was awarded
damages of $2,486.17 ($79,039.92 in 2021 USD). This was paid out of the
Tribe’s Trust Fund. The Tribe lost both the islands they believed to be
their rightful property and the costs associated with defending the trespass
action. 195
Speaking to the Legislature through his report, Proctor posed the question
of whether payment should be made to the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Tribes
for the illegal dispossession of these lands. The Legislative Research Committee
issued its response: the land would not be returned to the tribes and the sums
outstanding and never obtained would be paid to the tribes’ respective Trust
Funds—without interest.196
The sums repaid to the tribes at the direction of the Legislative Research
Committee in 1942 were not only grossly less than the then-present day value
when adjusting for inflation, but failed to take into account the interest to which
the tribes were entitled and would have realized on these sums if timely paid at
the time of divestiture. In essence, not only did the State steal from the tribes by
failing to remit value duly adjusted for inflation, but it further divested the tribes
of their expectant financial interests as well. At a minimum, the State failed to
repay the tribes for the fair market value of the interests in question when it chose
to tender only the original dollar amounts. It is an unsatisfactory argument that
“the State doesn’t pay interest as part of its sovereign immunity” because the
tribes, having been left without consideration for decades received an incomplete
remedy in 1942. If these transactions could ever be deemed a valid “accord and
satisfaction,” surely scrutiny would reveal that there was never an accord and the
State failed to satisfy.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Misappropriation of Trust Funds
Next, the Proctor Report addressed instances of misappropriation of Trust
Funds by the State in relation to both the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Tribes.
Id. at 3a.
Id. at 29 (citing “Annual Report of Land Agent” 1834).
196
Final Report of the Legislative Research Committee, supra note 178, at 45-46.
194
195
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Despite the voluminous accounting records presented as evidence with the report
(giving examples of payments remitted for the acquisition of basic necessities and
foodstuffs for the tribes), this section of the report fails in its mandate from
Special Counsel Webber to examine the root causes and problems that
precipitated the mishandling of funds initially. A review of Proctor’s reporting
reveals that this failing is the result of a lack of historical context—something this
Remonstrance has endeavored to remedy.
First focusing on misappropriations of Passamaquoddy Trust Fund
monies, Proctor listed the following irregularities:
1.) Impounded bank accounts totaling $1,718.70;197
2.) $10,000 loss realized on defaulted bonds purchased from
the City of Eastport by the State, on behalf of the Tribe;198
and
3.) $3,877.12 of funds belonging to the Passamaquoddy Trust
Fund, for balances accrued from the sale of timber rights,
instead deposited into the State’s General Fund from 19381940.199
As to the Penobscot Fund, Proctor listed a loss of $22,911.04 lost to the
impoundment of bank accounts in which the State had invested Fund monies.200
Again addressing the Legislature, Proctor’s report inquired whether the
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Trust Funds should be credited these amounts. In
the alternative, Proctor supposed, the Legislature also had the option to cancel
these amounts owed to the tribes “…on basis of the thousands spent . . . in excess
of treaty obligations.”201
The Legislative Research Committee recommended that only the
$3,877.12 owed to the Passamaquoddy Trust Fund be restored—without
interest—on the basis of mistake of law.202
As to the other outstanding losses, the Legislature stated its belief that
[T]hese sums were deposited in banks of the State of
Maine and in bonds of the City of Eastport in good
faith, that the losses which may be incurred are the
result of no more than the normal hazards
accompanying any investment program, and that no
The Proctor Report, supra note 39, at 12.
Id.
199
Id. at 5.
200
Id. at 4.
201
Id. at 12.
202
Final Report of the Legislative Research Committee, supra note 178, at 45.
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negligence on the part of the State in so investing the
Indian funds is apparent, and therefore recommends
no restoration of these sums to the funds.203
It is disingenuous for the State, having a fiduciary duty to the tribes, to
invest the tribes’ money with a financially insecure municipality when the
municipality cannot pay the bond, and to say it’s ‘not the State’s fault.’
Essentially, the State used tribal funds to reduce the amount that the State might
have to pay to support a moribund and bankrupt municipality of the State.
C. Disinterested and Without Interest: Recommendations of the Legislative
Research Committee on Maine’s ‘Indian Problem’
Expounding upon its rationale for denying the tribes any interest
whatsoever—for any of the losses noted in the Proctor Report—the Committee
explained:
In making these recommendations, the Committee is
basing its conclusions not upon any recognized legal
obligations but solely upon a sense of the State of its
responsibility for the protection of Indian welfare. In
recommending that not interest be included, the
Committee is mindful of the fact that its
contributions and appropriations to the Indians over
the period of many years has exceeded by hundreds
of thousands of dollars any of its financial
obligations arising from the treaties with the
Indians.204
In denying interests to the tribes occasioned by “hundreds of thousands of
dollars” paid to them over the course of “many years” in excess of treaty
obligations, the Commission stripped the tribes of legal relief duly accorded them
for deprivation of the enjoyment of their property over a period of years of
malfeasance. No consideration was lent or thought given to the separation of legal
remedy from ancillary benefits. In short, the State unilaterally decided that its
unrelated “overpayments” to the tribes in excess of “treaty obligations”—which,
fairly stated amounted to a paltry cache of stipend foodstuffs—were able to be
substituted in place of sums deprived and otherwise bearing significant interest. It
was another robbery.

203
204
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Had Proctor and the Committee ended their escapades there, the tribes
would have been left bereft of their rightful property and spared the indignity of a
superfluous racist
diatribe bearing on
In short, the State unilaterally decided that its unrelated
the delusions of a
“overpayments” to the tribes in excess of “treaty
group of legislators
obligations”—which, fairly stated amounted to a paltry
self-admittedly
cache of stipend foodstuffs—were able to be substituted
ignorant of the
in place of sums deprived and otherwise bearing
entirety of the
significant interest. It was another robbery.
history of Maine
Tribal-State
relations.
Unfortunately, the Committee had one last blow to deliver the tribes.
Even though the Committee had settled (albeit unfairly) the foregoing
unlawful and irregular transactions, it proceeded to launch into a defense of the
indefensible—levying gratuitous and racist insults en route to the same:
It is elementary that people who have no need for
self-dependence and self-reliance seldom develop it.
That is the status of the Maine Indians today.
Whether this attitude is wholly or in part Indian
nature, or whether it has been created by the
paternalistic attitude of the State in providing for
them, is a matter for conjecture—possibly both
factors have contributed. The Committee feels that at
least the elements of the Indian problem have been
cleared, and concurs in the following statement. . .
There are those amongst the Indians themselves and
in other places who have maintained that the Indians
in Maine were robbed. Our conclusion is that it is not
so, that they have been amply repaid for whatever
they gave up and excessively well-treated on the
financial side; that they never owned or occupied the
whole of the State of Maine; that the numbers of
Indians at the time of the treaties show the
impossibility of their having reduced to possession
any substantial part of the State; and that as a result
of the above conclusions the State is in a position to
deal with the Indians fairly but on a realistic basis
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with a policy looking to the eventual self-dependence
and self-reliance of each Indian.205
Having thus decreed, and in a haunting evocation of John Deane’s 1830
“Coercive System,” the Committee recommended the State adopt the following
policies:
Definition of “an Indian” as a person with at least one-quarter “Indian
blood”;206
 Implementation of vocational training for youth “wherever available”
and seemingly without discretion;207
 State sponsorship of “Indian handicraft business”;208
 Facilitation of agricultural vocational pursuits;209 and
 Restricting State assistance programs solely to tribal members
physically unable to find and perform a job.210
An orchestrated effort for a continuance of the failed policies of
agricultural oppression and a condemnation to a future as “handicraft” makers
that had for a century been incumbent of a state of poverty occasioned by the
State’s very own predatory policies, it was, of course, straight out of Maine’s tried
and true genocidal playbook.
That Maine has committed genocide against the tribes is not widely
accepted by the general public. In general, the prevailing consensus appears to be
that Maine may have unjustly enriched itself during a period of time where so
doing was “acceptable” or “common practice,” but there is no widespread
contemporary discourse advocating that Mainers are descended from a legacy of
literal genocide.
The United Nations has defined genocide as any of the following
acts committed with an intent to destroy—in whole or in part—a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group:


a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group;
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Id. at 47.
Id. at 46.
207
Id. at 47.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
205
206
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d. Imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group; and/or
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.211

PART V:
CODA
IX.

PRESENT DAY: A PATH FORWARD

“Let understanding and communication through education be the building blocks
of a new tribal-state relationship, one that recognizes and honors the struggles and
contributions of Native people.”
—Donna Loring (2008)
So, what can be done? While it’s true that nothing can wash away the sins
of the past, perhaps that assumes the wrong conclusion. Maybe, if the toothpaste
is out of the proverbial tube, rather than trying (and failing) to do the impossible
and putting it all back in, we instead started looking for a new container in which
to transfer it.
It’s a crude analogy, but it makes the point: contemporary efforts to
“rectify,” “solve,” or “make up for” blood already spent—while noble—aren’t
always practical. If, in endeavoring to make amends, our heart is in the right
place, let us refocus our efforts on initiatives that can create real, tangible
progress for the living.
As a coda to the foregoing historico-legal remonstrance of Maine’s
parasitic persecution of the tribes within its borders, the authors would like to
offer some limited, practical suggestions for ways in which the State of Maine and
the tribes can work together right now to make progress towards more humane
relations, justice between, and earned respect for one another.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277. It may well be noteworthy that the United States would not ratify this Treaty until
November 25, 1988—nearly 40 years after it was drafted.
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A. Pulling Back the Curtain: Restoring the Language of the Original Treaties to
Maine’s Constitution
A measure easily undertaken that would have the immediate and lasting
effect of enlightening Maine’s population, lawmakers, and courts would be
repatriation of the original text of Article X, Section 5, adapted from the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.212
This language—prefixed to the official publication of the laws passed by
the First Legislature of the State of Maine—was subsequently published in the
prefix of the Revised Statutes of Maine of 1841, 1857, and 1871, after which time
an amendment provisioned for the following:
Section 7. Original sections 1, 2, 5, of Article X
not to be printed; section 5 in full force:
Sections 1, 2 and 5, of Article 10 of the
Constitution, shall hereafter be omitted in any
printed copies thereof prefixed to the laws of the
State; but this shall not impair the validity of acts
under those sections; and said section 5 shall remain
in full force, as part of the Constitution, according
to the stipulations of said section, with the same
effect as if contained in said printed copies.213
Given the already substantial length of the Maine Constitution, Section 7’s
purpose is dubious, at best. Restoration of this language to the Maine Constitution
is both a symbolic gesture of Maine’s recognition of its legal obligations to the

Me. Const. art. X, § 5. The text read: The new State shall, as soon as the necessary
arrangements can be made for that purpose, assume and perform all the duties and obligations of
this Commonwealth, towards the Indians within said District of Maine, 'whether the same arise
from treaties, or otherwise; and for this purpose shall obtain the assent of said Indians, and their
release to this Commonwealth of claims and stipulations arising under the treaty at present
existing between the said Commonwealth and said Indians; and as an indemnification to such new
State, therefor, this Commonwealth, when such arrangements shall be completed, and the said
duties and obligations assumed, shall pay to said new State, the value of thirty thousand dollars, in
manner following, viz.: The said Commissioners shall set off by metes and bounds, so much of
any part of the land, within the said District, falling to this Commonwealth, in the division of the
public lands, hereinafter provided for, as in their estimation shall be of the value of thirty thousand
dollars; and this Commonwealth shall, thereupon, assign the same to the said new State, or in lieu
thereof, may pay the sum of thirty thousand dollars at its election; which election of the said
Commonwealth, shall be made within one year from the time that notice of the doings of the
Commissioners, on this subject, shall be made known to the Governor and Council; and if not
made within that time, the election shall be with the new State.
213
Id. art. X, § 7.
212
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tribes, as well as a corrective measure aimed at restoring this critical historic
information to the public domain in a manner that is practically accessible.
B. Amending the Maine Constitution: Establishing a Constitutional Officer on
Tribal Relations
The tribes have always had sovereignty. The question is not whether the
tribes are sovereign, but what it would mean to Maine tribes if they were free
from molestation to practice their sovereign status. Paternalistic views on the
matter have bred fears of “unintended consequences” if the tribes’ sovereignty
were recognized by the State. The unfortunate reality, however, is that the tribes
have been suffering from the damaging intended consequences occasioned by
restrictive State control for centuries.
Forced political subjugation of the sovereign tribes in Maine is predicated
upon a system designed both to siphon resources away from the tribes and keep
said tribes dependent. Paradoxically, Maine’s apparent desire to eliminate the
tribes altogether, while not vitiated, is certainly prolonged by such measures.
Inexcusable and entirely preventable hardship continues to befall Maine’s
indigenous populations. The Passamaquoddy Reservation at Pleasant Point has
not had potable drinking water in their community—ever. Attempts by
neighboring townships and municipalities to block tribal efforts to access clean
water were explained away as posing a threat to the water supply of these larger
population centers. The current system allowing for towns and municipalities to
have any influence over tribal issues is unproductive and produces inhumane
results.
Recognition of the tribes’ inherent sovereignty will afford a certain
freedom from Maine towns and municipalities that would act (and in the past
have acted) to harm the tribes. Through the channels created incident to the
recognition of their
sovereignty, the tribes
Maine seems to want a ‘hybrid
would be empowered to
relationship’ with the tribes—seeking complete
deal directly with the
control of matters like jurisdiction over felonies
federal government for
committed on reservation lands, control of
access to clean water,
sovereign status, and a stranglehold over any
emergency services, and
technical assistance needed political or economic efforts that bear even
remotely on ‘extra-tribal interests,’ all the while
in areas such as law
denying the tribes any conduit for channeling
enforcement, tribal courts,
their concerns to a governmental body equipped to
housing, healthcare, and
address these systemic inequities.
business—all areas the
State of Maine has
historically neglected.
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Indeed, following the passage of the Maine Indian Claims Act of 1980, after
which Maine dissolved its Department of Indian Affairs, the tribes would have no
direct discourse with either State or federal governments. This is, of course,
highly problematic because it deprives the tribes of any conduit for addressing
grievances and accessing governmental programs and assistance (similar to how
the rest of the general population and states access said resources).
Instead, Maine seems to want a ‘hybrid relationship’ with the tribes—
seeking complete control of matters like jurisdiction over felonies committed on
reservation lands, control of sovereign status, and a stranglehold over any political
or economic efforts that bear even remotely on ‘extra-tribal interests,’ all the
while denying the tribes any conduit for channeling their concerns to a
governmental body equipped to address these systemic inequities. Emulating the
models of intergovernmental discourse between the western tribes, states, and
federal government would be an appropriate starting place for remedying Maine’s
broken system of managing tribal affairs.
Recognition of tribal sovereignty would engender State-Tribal cooperation
on equal footing and, in so doing, require both powers to make mutually
beneficial decisions. It would foster a new environment of respect and
productivity the likes of which has yet to even be attempted in Maine history.
Maine can effect this change by taking permanent action to amend its
State Constitution. Constitutional change is neither drastic, nor unprecedented. It
is, however, entirely necessary. For decades, incoming Maine governors have
vacillated between executive orders recognizing tribal sovereignty or treating the
tribes in a paternalistic manner. This is not conducive to a building trust between
the State and the tribes.
Amending the Constitution to create a fifth Constitutional Officer, the
Secretary of Tribal Relations, would be a show of good faith by the State in
recognition of the extent of damage it has heretofore inflicted. As a constitutional
office, this would be a permanent position appointed by the Legislature to serve as
the official liaison between the State and the tribal governments. This singular
action—this one appointment—would recognize tribal sovereignty and
demonstrate Maine’s resolve to cultivate a new and honest relationship with the
Tribes.
This is something Maine can do now. It is entirely within the power of the
Legislature to create this Constitutional Office and the People of the State of
Maine have power to approve it.
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C. A New Beginning: Implementing a Bicentennial Accord between the
Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in Maine and the State of Maine
Yet another proposition—advanced by co-author of this Comment and
former Penobscot Tribal Representative to the Maine Legislature Donna Loring—
is the execution of an Executive Order to establish, and subsequent adoption of,
an Accord with the Tribes.214 A successful and well-written example is the
Centennial Accord between the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in
Washington State and the State of Washington.215 A 1989 treaty between the State
of Washington and 26 federally recognized tribes located therein, the Centennial
Accord seeks to memorialize the tribes’ and state’s reciprocal recognition of one
another’s sovereignty. It lays the framework for arms-length government-togovernment exchanges, dispute resolutions, and cooperative efforts between the
tribes and the state. Furthermore, it explicitly recognizes that it does not constitute
a derogation or abandonment of any previously-recognized rights or benefits
afforded to the tribes by the state.
Although State-Tribal relations remain imperfect, Washington is perceived
as the national leader when it comes to enlightened, intelligent, and humane
intercourse with the tribes living within its borders. In fact, where some states
(like Maine) are entirely lacking in having signed any such Accord with the tribes
living within their own borders, Washington has even adopted an “Out of State
Accord” recognizing the sovereignty of federally recognized tribes residing
outside its jurisdiction, so long as said tribal entities have treaty reserved rights in
Washington.216 These “above and beyond” efforts demonstrate a basic level of
institutional integrity and human decency.
Maine’s signatory to a “Bicentennial Accord”—aptly named given the
recent two-hundred-year anniversary of its statehood—would be not only a
showing of good faith, but a revelatory and historic step towards repairing its
relationship with the tribes. An Accord and formal recognition of sovereignty
would establish the proper governmental structure for arms-length interactions
between two cultures sharing one state. Moreover, such a document would serve
as competent evidence that the State of Maine recognizes the humanity of all its
citizens and endeavors to treat them with dignity and respect. It would, in effect,
A copy of proposed language to be implemented as the Bicentennial Accord is included in
Appendix C.
215
Centennial Accord between the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in Washington State and
the State of Washington, Aug. 4, 1989.
216
Accord between Federally Recognized Indian Tribes with Treaty Reserved Rights in
Washington State and the State of Washington, Dec. 9, 2004. The practical effect of this “Out of
State Accord” was to recognize the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation and
the Nez Perce, both of whom have ancestral ties to the Pacific Northwest and present-day
Washington.
214
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be Maine’s political passport into legitimate, humane, and respected 21st Century
politics—an arena from which it will continue to be excluded until it makes an
effort to address the grievous miscarriages of justice that persist within its
borders.
X.

CONCLUSION

“In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies,
but the silence of our friends.”
—Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929-1968 A.D.)
This Remonstrance has offered a critical historico-legal analysis of the
State of Maine’s policies and intercourse with the Native American people living
within its borders. By providing a detailed historical accounting of Euromerican
discourse with tribal sovereigns from first contact with the Europeans in 1604
through the period of 1892, the authors sought to establish the context in which
Maine political structures and systems were formed.
From Massachusetts’s initial imperative to expand and lift itself from
pauperism to the commercialization of the timber industry as a means of
converting Maine’s natural resources into a source of immense wealth, the land
and forests of present-day Maine have been commodified to serve the colonialist
agenda. The ontogeny of Maine’s political intercourse with the tribes is
particularly reflective of these parasitic practices. From the outset of statehood in
1820, Maine sought to usurp tribal ancestral resources to grow its fledgling
government.
In so doing, Maine became a pariah. Rather than abiding the typical form
and manner of state-tribal relations under the purview of the Congress, Maine
consciously manufactured a system of complete control in which it isolated the
Maine tribes and alienated them from their land for profit. When the land’s
valuable timber began to wane in supply, the State set about a regime of genocidal
practices designed to permanently disband the tribes in an effort to relieve itself of
the “burdens” of treaty obligations previously secured in dealings with
Massachusetts.
When compared against this historical context, the “twin pillars” of toxic
Indian law precedent in Maine—Murch and Newell—take on new meaning
revelatory of Maine’s clear intention to defraud and eliminate the tribes and in the
severity of the harm these decisions carry as standing precedent. Contemporary
evidence now strongly suggests that Maine’s political elite may have had a hand
in manipulating the Murch and Newell cases, weaponizing legal fictions to set off
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a cascade effect that paved the way for the Law Court’s attempted death blow to
tribal sovereignty in Newell.
But for the Legislature’s commissioning of the “Indian Papers” and
Proctor Report in 1942, the now undeniable evidence and confirmation of
Maine’s bad acts—and the elucidation of the insidious nature of the political
construct against which Murch and Newell arose—might have been lost to the
mists of time. Fortunately, Special Counsel Webber provisioned for what might
be fairly referred to as “Maine’s Nixon Tapes” in having the proceedings of the
Legislative Research Committee recorded.
From “The Indian Papers” and Proctor we get the State’s recognition of
the historical economic disenfranchisement and the related genocidal initiatives
designed to eliminate the tribes. Perhaps more shockingly, the Committee actually
moves past historical recognition and in real time and on record admits to this as
an ongoing objective of the State.
By engaging in this Remonstrance, this critical analysis arrives at the
conclusion that Maine’s historic predation of the tribes for economic benefit and
its subsequent persecution of the same continues to change form. Even today,
Maine’s reluctance or failure to engage in arm’s-length government-togovernment recognition of the tribes as sovereign entities (rather than the
powerless and, frankly, inconsequential “quasi-municipal” entities forced upon
the tribes under the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980) is a form of
ongoing colonization. And, uncomfortable though it may be for some to hear,
Maine’s continued dereliction of its treaty obligations to the tribes—especially in
light of the harm it has proactively caused them—fits entirely within the United
Nations’ definition of genocide.
Despite all that has transpired—the bloodshed, the land stolen, the dignity
stripped, and justice deprived—there is hope. There is hope that Maine will join
with states like Washington in taking relatively simple, practical, and immediately
viable steps to recognize the sovereignty of the tribes. Although Maine cannot “go
back in time” and undo what has been done, it can adapt and it can change for the
better.
The Remonstrance—first penned in 1833—continues to the present. We
are still waiting for justice. Maine can still consider our voices, own its
responsibilities, and do the right thing.

Loring, Mehnert & Gousse

69

APPENDIX A
1818 PENOBSCOT TREATY WITH MASSACHUSETTS:
A MAP OF THE FOUR TOWNSHIPS
Credit: Micah Pawling & Donald Soctomah
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APPENDIX B
REMONSTRANCE OF THE PENOBSCOT TRIBE (JUNE 1833)
To the Governour and Council of the State of Maine
The undersigned Indians of the Penobscot Tribe beg leave to state, that on the 10th of June
1833 a sale was made of certain of the lands belonging to the Tribe, and that the deeds were
signed by the Governour and a few other Indians, without the knowledge or consent of the
undersigned. They beg leave to state, that they believe that the whole business relative to
the sale, was transacted in a fraudulent manner and with the intention of injuring the Tribe
in their property & rights. They further state, that as soon as they understood what had been
done by the Governour and some of the Tribe at the instigation of Thomas Bartlet and one
Lovejoy, they called a meeting of the Tribe, at which the Governour & chiefs were present
and General Mark Trafton presided, and unanimously voted, that the deed or instrument
presented to the Indians by Lovejoy and Bartlet, and which received the signature of the
Governour & some of the Indians, is disapproved by the Tribe and by the Governor himself
and that the above mentioned writing was obtained by fraud & deception—that the persons
who attempted to purchase the land, promised to come & settle the business the next day
but failed to do so—and voted, also, that the names of the Lt. Governour & some other
Indians who were not present, were put to the above named deed without authority—voted,
that the Agent notify the Commissioners that the Indians are ready to receive proposals for
the purchase by the State, of one or all of their Townships. The undersigned conceive it to
be their duty solemnly to protest against all the proceedings had relative to the sale of their
lands as above expressed by their unanimous vote. They beg leave to state, as above
expressed in their vote, that they are willing to negotiate relative to the sale of their lands,
provided the same can be done with the full knowledge of the Tribe. They pray that all that
has been done by a few of the Tribe at the instigation of the above Bartlet and Lovejoy
relative to a sale of their lands, may be void. And your petitioners as in duty bound will
pray.
Capt. Athian
Capt. Francis Sabeir
Capt. Pol Joseph
Capt. Michael
Capt. Saccis
Sappeal Mohawk
Dec. Joseph
Fransue
Newell
Joe Polis
Peelis
Piel
Sapiel Sacolexis
Piel Mitchael

Athian
Piel Lola
Penwith
Piel Mitchal
Saul
John
Dec Mitchal Lewis
Sabatis
John Mary
Nicola
Piel
John Mary Neptin
Sabatis
Piel Pol
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Noel Saccis
Orson
Piel Joseph
Dec Fransue
Francis Crane
Piel Misel
Lewis Thoma
John Mitchal
Sac Joseph
Joh Mary Swassian
Nicala
Lewis Neptin
Joh Deny
Stanislaus
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Photograph of the original marks of the signatories to the Remonstrance of 1833.
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APPENDIX C
PROPOSED FORM LANGUAGE OF BICENTENNIAL ACCORD
BICENTENNIAL ACCORD between the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in
Maine and the State of Maine
I.

PREAMBLE AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

This Accord dated ________, is executed between the federally recognized Indian
Tribes of Maine signatory to this Accord and the State of Maine through its
governor, in order to better achieve mutual goals through an improved relationship
between their sovereign governments. This Accord provides a framework for
government-to-government relationship and implementation procedures to assure
execution of that relationship.
Each party to this Accord respects the sovereignty of the other. The respective
sovereignty of the state and each federally recognized tribe provide paramount
authority for that party to exist and to govern. The parties share in their relationship
particular respect for the values and culture represented by tribal governments.
Further, the parties share a desire for complete Accord between the State of Maine
and the federally recognized tribes in Maine reflecting a full government-togovernment relationship and will work with all elements of state and tribal
governments to achieve such an accord.
II. PARTIES
There are four federally recognized Indian tribes in the State of Maine. Each
sovereign tribe has an independent relationship with each other and the state. This
Accord, provides the framework for that relationship with each other and the state.
This Accord provides the framework for the state of Maine, through its governor,
and signatory tribes.
The parties recognize that the state of Maine is governed in part by independent
state officials. Therefore, although, this Accord has been initiated by the signatory
tribes and the governor, it welcomes the participation of, inclusion in and execution
by chief representatives of all elements of state government so that the governmentto-government relationship described herein is completely and broadly
implemented between the state and the tribes.
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III.

PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES

This Accord illustrates the commitment by the parties to implementation of the
government-to-government relationship, a relationship reaffirmed as state policy
by gubernatorial proclamation dated _____. This relationship respects the
sovereign status of the parties, enhances and improves communications between
them, and facilitates resolutions of issues.
This Accord is intended to build confidence among the parties in the governmentto-government relationship by outlining the process for implementing the policy.
Not only is this process intended to implement the relationship, but also it is
intended to institutionalize it with the organizations represented by the parties. The
parties will continue to strive for complete institutionalization of the governmentto-government relationship by seeking accord among all the tribes and the elements
of state government.
This Accord also commits the parties to the initial tasks that will translate the
government-to-government relationship into more efficient, improved and
beneficial services to the Indian and non-Indian people of Maine. This Accord
encourages and provides the foundation and framework for specific agreements
among the parties outlining specific tasks to address or resolve specific issues.
The parties recognize that implementation of this Accord will require a
comprehensive education effort to promote understanding of the government-togovernment relationship within their own governmental organizations and with the
public.
IV.

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

While this Accord addresses the relationship between the parties, its ultimate
purpose is to improve the services delivered to people and parties.
Immediately and periodically, the parties shall establish goals for improved
services and identify the obstacles to the achievement of those goals. At an annual
meeting, the parties will develop joint strategies and specific agreements to outline
tasks, overcome obstacles and achieve specific goals.
The parties recognize that a key principle of their relationship is a requirement that
individuals working to resolve issues of mutual concern are accountable to act in a
manner consistent with this Accord.
The state of Maine is organized into a variety of large and separate departments
under its governor, other independently elected officials and a variety of boards and
commissions. Each tribe on the other hand, is a unique government organization
with different management and decision-making structures.
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The Chief of Staff of the governor of the state of Maine is accountable to the
governor for the implementation of this Accord. State agency directors are
accountable to the governor through the chief of staff for the related activities of
their agencies. Each director will initiate a procedure within her/his agency by
which the government-to-government policy will be implemented. Among other
things these procedures will require persons responsible for dealing with issues of
mutual concern to respect the government-to-government relationship within which
the issue must be addressed. Each agency will establish a documented plan of
accountability and may establish more detailed procedures in subsequent
agreements between tribes and the particular agency.
The parties recognize that their relationship will successfully address issues of
mutual concern when communication is clear, direct and between persons
responsible for addressing the concern. The parties recognize that in state
government, accountability is best achieved when this responsibility rests solely
within each state agency. Therefore, it is the objective of the state that each
particular agency be directly accountable for implementation of the governmentto-government relationship in dealing with issues of concern to the parties. Each
agency will facilitate this objective by identifying individuals directly responsible
for issues of mutual concern.
Each tribe also recognizes that a system of accountability within its organization is
critical to successful implementation of the relationship. Therefore, tribal officials
will direct their staff to communicate within the spirit of this Accord with the
particular agency, which under the organization of state government, the authority
and responsibility to deal with the particular issue of concern to the tribe.
In order to accomplish these objectives, each tribe must ensure that its current tribal
organization, decision-making process and relevant tribal personnel is known to
each state agency with which the tribe is addressing an issue of mutual concern.
Further, each tribe may establish a more detailed organizational structure, decision
making process, system of accountability and other procedures for implementing
the government-to-government relationship in subsequent agreements with various
state agencies. Finally, each tribe will establish a document system of
accountability.
As a component of the system of accountability within state and tribal governments,
the parties will review and evaluate at the annual meeting the implementation of
the government-to-government relationship. A management report will be issued
summarizing this evaluation and will include joint strategies and specific
agreements to outline tasks, overcome obstacles, and achieve specific goals.
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The Chief of Staff will also use his/her organizational discretion to help implement
the government-to-government relationship. The Senior Advisor on Tribal Affairs
will assist the chief of staff in implementing the government-to-government
relationship by providing state agency directors information with which to educate
employees and constituent groups as defined in the accountability plan about the
requirement of the government-to-government relationship.
V.

SOVEREIGNTY AND DISCLAIMERS

Each of the parties respects the sovereignty of each other party. In executing this
Accord, no party waives any rights, including treaty rights, immunities, including
sovereign immunities, or jurisdiction. Neither does this Accord diminish any rights
or protections afforded other Indian persons or entities under state or federal law.
Through this Accord parties strengthen their collective ability to successfully
resolve issues of mutual concern.
While the relationship described by this Accord provides increased ability to solve
problems, it likely will not result in a resolution of all issues. Therefore, inherent in
their relationship is the right of each of the parties to elevate an issue of importance
to any decision-making authority of another party, including, where appropriate,
that party’s executive office.
Signatory parties have executed this Accord on the date of ____and agreed to be
duly bound by its commitments.

Remonstrance of the Penobscot Tribe
JUNE 1833
To the Governour and Council of the State of Maine
The undersigned Indians of the Penobscot Tribe beg leave to state, that on the 10th of June 1833 a
sale was made of certain of the lands belonging to the Tribe, and that the deeds were signed by the
Governour and a few other Indians, without the knowledge or consent of the undersigned. They
beg leave to state, that they believe that the whole business relative to the sale, was transacted
in a fraudulent manner and with the intention of injuring the Tribe in their property & rights.
They further state, that as soon as they understood what had been done by the Governour and
some of the Tribe at the instigation of Thomas Bartlet and one Lovejoy, they called a meeting of
the Tribe, at which the Governour & chiefs were present and General Mark Trafton presided, and
unanimously voted, that the deed or instrument presented to the Indians by Lovejoy and Bartlet,
and which received the signature of the Governour & some of the Indians, is disapproved by the
Tribe and by the Governor himself and that the above mentioned writing was obtained by fraud &
deception—that the persons who attempted to purchase the land, promised to come & settle the
business the next day but failed to do so—and voted, also, that the names of the Lt. Governour &
some other Indians who were not present, were put to the above named deed without authority—
voted, that the Agent notify the Commissioners that the Indians are ready to receive proposals
for the purchase by the State, of one or all of their Townships. The undersigned conceive it to be
their duty solemnly to protest against all the proceedings had relative to the sale of their lands as
above expressed by their unanimous vote. They beg leave to state, as above expressed in their
vote, that they are willing to negotiate relative to the sale of their lands, provided the same can
be done with the full knowledge of the Tribe. They pray that all that has been done by a few of the
Tribe at the instigation of the above Bartlet and Lovejoy relative to a sale of their lands, may be
void. And your petitioners as in duty bound will pray.
Capt. Athian
Capt. Francis Sabeir
Capt. Pol Joseph
Capt. Michael
Capt. Saccis
Sappeal Mohawk
Dec. Joseph
Fransue
Newell
Joe Polis
Peelis
Piel
Sapiel Sacolexis
Piel Mitchael

Athian
Piel Lola
Penwith
Piel Mitchal
Saul
John
Dec Mitchal Lewis
Sabatis
John Mary
Nicola
Piel
John Mary Neptin
Sabatis
Piel Pol

Noel Saccis
Orson
Piel Joseph
Dec Fransue
Francis Crane
Piel Misel
Lewis Thoma
John Mitchal
Sac Joseph
Joh Mary Swassian
Nicala
Lewis Neptin
Joh Deny
Stanislaus

